1. Citizenship Law
a. Jus sanguinis Provisions
Japan’s citizenship laws operate through a jus sanguinis structure.[1] According to Japan’s Nationality Law, children born to a Japanese national parent shall be considered a Japanese national, with no distinction between children born within or outside of the national boundaries.[2] If the father of a child, who was a Japanese citizen, died before the child’s birth, the child will be a citizen by descent.[3] A child born in the territory of Japan to two stateless persons or to parents who are unknown will be a citizen of Japan.[4]
Another acquisition method, citizenship by acknowledgement, exists in Japan. Under Japanese law, a child born to a Japanese mother and a foreign father will become a citizen due to the fact that Japanese law establishes the relationship of the mother and child automatically at birth.[5] However, for children born to Japanese fathers and a foreign mother, an acknowledgement is required from the citizen father.[6]Due to a 2008 Supreme Court judgement, children born to a non-Japanese father and a Japanese parent can now gain citizenship if the parents are out of wedlock by acknowledgement of the relationship by the citizen father after the birth of the child.[7] Before the judgement, children born to a non-Japanese mother and citizen father out of wedlock would not be eligible for citizenship unless the father acknowledged the legitimacy of the child before the child’s birth.[8] A child can be presumed to be born in wedlock if the parents have been previously married and the child is born 200 days or more after the start of such marriage or 300 days or less after the divorce of such parents.[9] A child born out of wedlock to a non-Japanese mother and Japanese father may obtain Japanese nationality through acknowledgement after the birth if the child is under 18 years of age, a notification is made to the Minister of Justice, and the father or mother who has made the acknowledgement is a citizen at the time of the child’s birth as well as is currently a citizen.[10] If the Japanese father does not voluntarily acknowledge a child (nin’i ninchi),[11] then the child (or their agent) can seek compulsory acknowledgement (kyousei ninchi), a process to procure acknowledgement through arbitration, or if unsuccessful, a lawsuit.[12]
There is no statutory protection such as a grant of residence status or nationality for stateless persons based on the fact that they are stateless.[13] Thus, stateless persons in Japan do not enjoy freedom of movement (Article 26 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons) or the benefit of expulsion prohibition (Article 31 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons). A 2015 report supported by UNHCR outlined the “convergence and divergence” between the statelessness conventions and Japanese citizenship laws and administrative policies, finding major gaps in the laws of Japan (including the lack of a definition of ‘statelessness’ or ‘stateless person’).[14] Stateless persons who do not have residence status in Japan (‘Non-resident Stateless Persons’) are deprived of nearly all of the rights and protections provided to persons with Japanese nationality or residence status.[15] On the other hand, stateless persons with residence status (Resident Stateless Persons) can enjoy the benefits of social insurance including pension and health insurance, financial support for disabled persons or childcare, and subsidies for residence.[16] Even for Resident Stateless Persons, there is a risk of receiving a deportation order upon being deemed to fulfil certain deportable conditions.[17] Practical difficulty in enforcing such deportation orders often result in such stateless persons remaining in Japan with an unstable status without any assurance of right to stay in Japan or to avoid further deportation.[18] A 2017 report supported by UNHCR showed that with the lack of a legal definition of statelessness, Japan administratively does not follow classification of stateless persons in accordance with international law which can lead to lesser reliance on official statistics due to duplication of numbers or can lead to misclassification.[19]
b. Naturalized Citizenship
A process for naturalization is available for foreign nationals, stipulated by Article 5 of Japan’s Nationality Law.[20] In order to be eligible, the applicant must have continuously resided in Japan for at least five years, must not have nationality of another country, and have never been involved in terrorist activities, among other requirements.[21] While Article 5(i) of the Nationality Act (Act No 147 of 1950) continues to state a minimum residency period of five years on the face of the legislation, the Ministry of Justice announced revised administrative screening guidelines, forming part of Japan’s ‘Comprehensive Foreign Policy Measures’ on 27 March 2026, taking effect on 1 April 2026.[22] Under these guidelines, the practical residency threshold applied in screening decisions has been raised to ten consecutive years, aligning naturalization with the existing permanent residency standard.[23] There is no naturalization process available explicitly to refugees or stateless persons.
However, there is a provision stipulating a separate naturalization process for ‘aliens’.[24] ‘Aliens’ can be eligible for this process if they have residence in Japan for three consecutive years and are by birth the child of a Japanese citizen, they have residence in Japan for three consecutive years and was born in Japan, or who has had residence in Japan for ten consecutive years.[25] Therefore, to obtain a legal residency status in Japan, one would need to pursue recognition of refugee status. The legislative overhauls passed by the Japanese Diet in June 2023 had also established that the refugee convention status is no longer the sole protection-based pathway to legal residency due to the official rollout of the Complementary Protection (Hokan-teki Hogo) system on 1 December 2023.[26] Concurrently, because Japan still lacks a dedicated, statutory Statelessness Determination Procedure, individuals who fail to qualify under these broader tracks face heightened enforcement risks under the new “three-claim limit”, enforced in June 2024, which actively permits the deportation of asylum seekers on their third application or higher.[27] Consequently, stateless individuals left without legal residency status remain trapped indefinitely on Provisional Release (Karishōmen), which completely strips them of fundamental socio-economic rights such as healthcare and the right to work.[28]
c. Dual Citizenship
Dual citizenship is not recognized in Japan. If a Japanese citizen acquires citizenship elsewhere, they will lose their Japanese citizenship.[29] Japanese nationals possessing another nationality must make a choice on which citizenship to take, and deprive themselves of the other nationality.[30] The choice must be made before reaching twenty years of age if they obtain the foreign nationality and Japanese citizenship prior to becoming eighteen years of age, or within two years from that time if it is after.[31]
2. Treaty Ratification Status
While Japan is not a party to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, it has acceded to all other relevant human rights treaties without any relevant reservations.
In 2018 concluding observations by the CERD Committee, concerns were raised regarding Koreans who remain as foreign nationals after multiple generations of living in Japan and, as a result, are unable to vote or be public servants or engage in decision making.[32] Further, the Committee expressed concerns about the fact that Korean schools in Japan “do not receive support from the High School Tuition Support Fund” and that Korean women experience pervasive discrimination based on their nationality and gender.[33] Due to its ratification of the CERD, Japan is obligated to protect persons in its territory from discrimination based on nationality or legal status as well as ensure their equal civil rights regardless of nationality or legal status.[34]
Article 1(2) of the CERDexplicitly states that it shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, or preferences made by a State Party between citizens and non-citizens.[35] While the treaty prevents Japan from treating a person differently based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, it permits the state to differentiate rights based on whether a person holds Japanese citizenship or a legal residence visa.[36] Consequently, the Japanese government maintains that distinctions in civil rights, voting, social welfare, or deportation vulnerabilities based purely on immigration or stateless status are legally valid under the core text of the CERD.[37]
That position should, however, be qualified by Article 1(3) of the CERD, which states that nothing in the instrument should be read as undermining States’ nationality laws, so long as those laws do not discriminate on the basis of a particular nationality.[38] This is reinforced by the Committee’s General Recommendation XXX, which interprets Article 1(2) restrictively and requires that any differential treatment between citizens and non‑citizens must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim.[39]
Concluding observations by the CRC Committee in 2019 also recommended that Japan strengthen its Nationality Law in order to better protect against de jure statelessness, to grant citizenship at birth to children who would otherwise be stateless, and to ensure that children of irregular migrants in particular are registered at birth.[40] It was further recommended that Japan develop a statelessness determination procedure (SDP) to “properly identify and protect stateless children”.[41] As a party to the CRC, Japan is bound to ensure that all births in its territory are registered immediately.[42]
In its 2017 UPR, Japan was recommended to accede to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.[43]In Japan’s subsequent 4th Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycle in 2023, member states reissued explicit recommendations urging Japan to accede to both the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions and to establish a formal Statelessness Determination Procedure (SDP).[44] However, the government of Japan has maintained its stance of non-acceptance, continually asserting in its official state responses that its existing domestic legal framework, specifically the safeguard in Article 2(iii) of the Nationality Act, is already sufficient to prevent generational statelessness within its territory.[45] Since then, the Japanese government amended its internal operational guidelines to address statelessness more explicitly during status screenings, cooperating with technical recommendations from the UNHCR.[46] Furthermore, the enforcement of the Complementary Protection system in December 2023 provides an auxiliary legal pathway through which certain conflict-displaced, highly vulnerable individuals can obtain a Long-Term Resident visa status, circumventing the rigid parameters of the 1951 Refugee Convention.[47] However, UNHCR has flagged concerns regarding increasing risks of refoulement urging the government to address statelessness more explicitly.[48]
| Country | Stateless 1 | Stateless 2 | Refugee | ICCPR | ICESCR | ICERD | CRC | CEDAW |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan |