Overview

Law

law_background_image

1. Citizenship Law

a. Jus sanguinis Provisions

Japan’s citizenship laws operate through a jus sanguinis structure.[1] According to Japan’s Nationality Law, children born to a Japanese national parent shall be considered a Japanese national, with no distinction between children born within or outside of the national boundaries.[2] If the father of a child, who was a Japanese citizen, died before the child’s birth, the child will be a citizen by descent.[3] A child born in the territory of Japan to two stateless persons or to parents who are unknown will be a citizen of Japan.[4]

Another acquisition method, citizenship by acknowledgement, exists in Japan. Under Japanese law, a child born to a Japanese mother and a foreign father will become a citizen due to the fact that Japanese law establishes the relationship of the mother and child automatically at birth.[5] However, for children born to Japanese fathers and a foreign mother, an acknowledgement is required from the citizen father.[6]Due to a 2008 Supreme Court judgement, children born to a non-Japanese father and a Japanese parent can now gain citizenship if the parents are out of wedlock by acknowledgement of the relationship by the citizen father after the birth of the child.[7] Before the judgement, children born to a non-Japanese mother and citizen father out of wedlock would not be eligible for citizenship unless the father acknowledged the legitimacy of the child before the child’s birth.[8] A child can be presumed to be born in wedlock if the parents have been previously married and the child is born 200 days or more after the start of such marriage or 300 days or less after the divorce of such parents.[9] A child born out of wedlock to a non-Japanese mother and Japanese father may obtain Japanese nationality through acknowledgement after the birth if the child is under 18 years of age, a notification is made to the Minister of Justice, and the father or mother who has made the acknowledgement is a citizen at the time of the child’s birth as well as is currently a citizen.[10] If the Japanese father does not voluntarily acknowledge a child (nin’i ninchi),[11] then the child (or their agent) can seek compulsory acknowledgement (kyousei ninchi), a process to procure acknowledgement through arbitration, or if unsuccessful, a lawsuit.[12]

There is no statutory protection such as a grant of residence status or nationality for stateless persons based on the fact that they are stateless.[13] Thus, stateless persons in Japan do not enjoy freedom of movement (Article 26 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons) or the benefit of expulsion prohibition (Article 31 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons). A 2015 report supported by UNHCR outlined the “convergence and divergence” between the statelessness conventions and Japanese citizenship laws and administrative policies, finding major gaps in the laws of Japan (including the lack of a definition of ‘statelessness’ or ‘stateless person’).[14] Stateless persons who do not have residence status in Japan (‘Non-resident Stateless Persons’) are deprived of nearly all of the rights and protections provided to persons with Japanese nationality or residence status.[15] On the other hand, stateless persons with residence status (Resident Stateless Persons) can enjoy the benefits of social insurance including pension and health insurance, financial support for disabled persons or childcare, and subsidies for residence.[16] Even for Resident Stateless Persons, there is a risk of receiving a deportation order upon being deemed to fulfil certain deportable conditions.[17] Practical difficulty in enforcing such deportation orders often result in such stateless persons remaining in Japan with an unstable status without any assurance of right to stay in Japan or to avoid further deportation.[18] A 2017 report supported by UNHCR showed that with the lack of a legal definition of statelessness, Japan administratively does not follow classification of stateless persons in accordance with international law which can lead to lesser reliance on official statistics due to duplication of numbers or can lead to misclassification.[19]

b. Naturalized Citizenship

A process for naturalization is available for foreign nationals, stipulated by Article 5 of Japan’s Nationality Law.[20] In order to be eligible, the applicant must have continuously resided in Japan for at least five years, must not have nationality of another country, and have never been involved in terrorist activities, among other requirements.[21] While Article 5(i) of the Nationality Act (Act No 147 of 1950) continues to state a minimum residency period of five years on the face of the legislation, the Ministry of Justice announced revised administrative screening guidelines, forming part of Japan’s ‘Comprehensive Foreign Policy Measures’ on 27 March 2026, taking effect on 1 April 2026.[22] Under these guidelines, the practical residency threshold applied in screening decisions has been raised to ten consecutive years, aligning naturalization with the existing permanent residency standard.[23] There is no naturalization process available explicitly to refugees or stateless persons. 

However, there is a provision stipulating a separate naturalization process for ‘aliens’.[24] ‘Aliens’ can be eligible for this process if they have residence in Japan for three consecutive years and are by birth the child of a Japanese citizen, they have residence in Japan for three consecutive years and was born in Japan, or who has had residence in Japan for ten consecutive years.[25] Therefore, to obtain a legal residency status in Japan, one would need to pursue recognition of refugee status. The legislative overhauls passed by the Japanese Diet in June 2023 had also established that the refugee convention status is no longer the sole protection-based pathway to legal residency due to the official rollout of the Complementary Protection (Hokan-teki Hogo) system on 1 December 2023.[26] Concurrently, because Japan still lacks a dedicated, statutory Statelessness Determination Procedure, individuals who fail to qualify under these broader tracks face heightened enforcement risks under the new “three-claim limit”, enforced in June 2024, which actively permits the deportation of asylum seekers on their third application or higher.[27] Consequently, stateless individuals left without legal residency status remain trapped indefinitely on Provisional Release (Karishōmen), which completely strips them of fundamental socio-economic rights such as healthcare and the right to work.[28]

c. Dual Citizenship

Dual citizenship is not recognized in Japan. If a Japanese citizen acquires citizenship elsewhere, they will lose their Japanese citizenship.[29] Japanese nationals possessing another nationality must make a choice on which citizenship to take, and deprive themselves of the other nationality.[30] The choice must be made before reaching twenty years of age if they obtain the foreign nationality and Japanese citizenship prior to becoming eighteen years of age, or within two years from that time if it is after.[31]

2. Treaty Ratification Status

While Japan is not a party to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, it has acceded to all other relevant human rights treaties without any relevant reservations. 

In 2018 concluding observations by the CERD Committee, concerns were raised regarding Koreans who remain as foreign nationals after multiple generations of living in Japan and, as a result, are unable to vote or be public servants or engage in decision making.[32] Further, the Committee expressed concerns about the fact that Korean schools in Japan “do not receive support from the High School Tuition Support Fund” and that Korean women experience pervasive discrimination based on their nationality and gender.[33] Due to its ratification of the CERD, Japan is obligated to protect persons in its territory from discrimination based on nationality or legal status as well as ensure their equal civil rights regardless of nationality or legal status.[34]

Article 1(2) of the CERDexplicitly states that it shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, or preferences made by a State Party between citizens and non-citizens.[35] While the treaty prevents Japan from treating a person differently based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, it permits the state to differentiate rights based on whether a person holds Japanese citizenship or a legal residence visa.[36] Consequently, the Japanese government maintains that distinctions in civil rights, voting, social welfare, or deportation vulnerabilities based purely on immigration or stateless status are legally valid under the core text of the CERD.[37]

That position should, however, be qualified by Article 1(3) of the CERD, which states that nothing in the instrument should be read as undermining States’ nationality laws, so long as those laws do not discriminate on the basis of a particular nationality.[38] This is reinforced by the Committee’s General Recommendation XXX, which interprets Article 1(2) restrictively and requires that any differential treatment between citizens and non‑citizens must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim.[39]

Concluding observations by the CRC Committee in 2019 also recommended that Japan strengthen its Nationality Law in order to better protect against de jure statelessness, to grant citizenship at birth to children who would otherwise be stateless, and to ensure that children of irregular migrants in particular are registered at birth.[40] It was further recommended that Japan develop a statelessness determination procedure (SDP) to “properly identify and protect stateless children”.[41] As a party to the CRC, Japan is bound to ensure that all births in its territory are registered immediately.[42]

In its 2017 UPR, Japan was recommended to accede to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.[43]In Japan’s subsequent 4th Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycle in 2023, member states reissued explicit recommendations urging Japan to accede to both the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions and to establish a formal Statelessness Determination Procedure (SDP).[44] However, the government of Japan has maintained its stance of non-acceptance, continually asserting in its official state responses that its existing domestic legal framework, specifically the safeguard in Article 2(iii) of the Nationality Act, is already sufficient to prevent generational statelessness within its territory.[45] Since then, the Japanese government amended its internal operational guidelines to address statelessness more explicitly during status screenings, cooperating with technical recommendations from the UNHCR.[46] Furthermore, the enforcement of the Complementary Protection system in December 2023 provides an auxiliary legal pathway through which certain conflict-displaced, highly vulnerable individuals can obtain a Long-Term Resident visa status, circumventing the rigid parameters of the 1951 Refugee Convention.[47] However, UNHCR has flagged concerns regarding increasing risks of refoulement urging the government to address statelessness more explicitly.[48]

Status of Accession of International Human Rights Treaties
Country Stateless 1 Stateless 2 Refugee ICCPR ICESCR ICERD CRC CEDAW
Japan
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Signifies that the country is a party to the convention
Stateless 1 – 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
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Signifies that the country is not a party to the convention
Stateless 2 – 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

Population

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1. Reported Stateless Persons

Japan has shown fluctuations in the reported statistics on stateless individuals over the past few years. The country has the highest reported stateless population in East Asia, with 508 stateless persons reported to UNHCR in 2022, a decrease of  199 persons from 2021 and 2020, when the country reported 707 stateless persons.[49] Many of the reported stateless population in Japan are children of irregular migrants and foundling children. 

It is estimated that the actual number of stateless persons in Japan is far larger than the above numbers reflect as the number of stateless persons in Japan under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate only reflects cases of those recognized by the Japanese government.[50] UNHCR’s representatives in Japan have pointed out that the actual number of stateless persons in Japan is not accurately captured by the official estimates due to the lack of consistent definition for “statelessness” or “stateless person” and possibility of duplication among various estimates.[51]

,

Country2019 (year start)[52]2020 (year end)[53]2021 (year end)[54]2022 (year end)[55]2023[56]2024[57]2025[58]
Japan709707707508486479508

2. Persons at Risk of Statelessness 

A child born to foreign parents in the territory of Japan may be at risk of statelessness if they are not eligible for citizenship elsewhere due to gaps in citizenship legislation. Children born to migrants and abandoned children risk statelessness due to presumed links to foreign nations which can, at times, undermine the legal protection for such children recognised in Japanese laws.[59]

Historical context and legal frameworks suggest that certain populations, particularly Zainichi Koreans, persons of Korean ethnic descent permanently residing in Japan, are at a higher risk for statelessness in Japan.[60] This is especially true for those who chose not to apply for South Korean nationality in the 1960s. While many Zainichi Koreans have naturalized as Japanese citizens since the 1990s, to this day their legal status remains complex, and the application process is intricate and requires renouncing any dual citizenship they may hold.[61]

Individuals who are the children of Indochinese refugees from Thailand escaping the first Indochina War to live in Japan are also at a high risk of statelessness. Many of these refugees’ children were born and brought up in Thailand but it is nearly impossible for them to trace their roots or obtain relevant documents, making it challenging to prove ties to Vietnam, Laos, or Thailand.  A number of these individuals resort to illegal entry into Japan to find work but are rendered stateless.[62]

3. Stateless Refugee

In 2022, among the 17,406 refugees in Japan according to UNHCR’s mandate, the Japanese government reported 9 stateless refugees to UNHCR.[63] In 2025, Japan continued to record very low refugee recognition rates despite rising asylum applications: the Justice Ministry received 11,298 applications and recognised 187 refugees in 2025.[64] Although these figures are believed to significantly undercount the actual stateless population.

As noted above, while Japan is a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,[65] its domestic laws do not provide a definition for statelessness. The unique status of stateless refugees in Japan has however been recognised and examined by the courts of Japan.[66]

4. Undetermined Nationalities 

In Japan’s 2020 census, the nationality of 131,684 foreigners in Japan was categorized as “stateless and name of country not reported”.[67] The discrepancy between the number of such “stateless and name of country not reported” persons from the number of UNHCR-identified stateless persons may be explained by the fact that the former number includes individuals with undetermined nationality or who did not report their nationality (but may nonetheless be recognized as nationals).[68] Japan is the only country in East Asia with publicly accessible census statistics available in English on the citizenship status of foreigners.[69]

While not recognised as stateless persons by the Japanese government or UNHCR, a major group within Japan whose nationality status remains unresolved is the children of ethnic Koreans who currently hold the categorisation of “citizens of the Korean Peninsula (Korea or Chōsen)”. This population group may opt to claim South Korean citizenship or seek Japanese citizenship through naturalization and until they do so are considered to be “special permanent residents” which enables their access to services and temporary travel documents.[70] Of the over 800,000 registered Koreans in Japan,[71] 25,358 persons remain registered as Chōsen in 2022.[72]

Causes of Statelessness

statelessness_background_image

1. Causes of Statelessness

The context of statelessness in Japan has been quite extensively studied with a series of mapping reports commissioned by UNHCR having been undertaken between 2010 and 2017 as well as a number of independent articles published in English and Japanese.[73] Within identified groups of stateless persons in Japan, in particular, children are affected by conflict of nationality laws and children of unregistered migrants and abandoned children are particularly affected.[74]

2. Lack of Legal Safeguards Against Childhood Statelessness

Under the Nationality Law of Japan, children born in Japan to stateless parents and foundling children born in Japan are considered nationals.[75] Article 2(iii) of Japan’s Nationality Act grants Japanese nationality at birth only in the narrow circumstance where a child is born in Japan and both parents are either unknown or stateless, excluding children born to one stateless and one foreign‑national parent, as well as children born in Japan to known foreign parents who are unable to transmit their own nationality under their domestic law.[76] Because Japan does not have a broader “otherwise stateless” safeguard in its nationality legislation, there is a clear gap between the law and the CRC Committee’s recommendation that Japan confer citizenship at birth on all children who would otherwise be stateless.

However, research has shown that abandoned children of migrant workers, mixed-status families and multigeneration translational families are at times presumed to possess foreign nationality or have links to foreign states and are in turn, denied the protection from these provisions.[77]A survey undertaken by the Japan Immigration agency in 2020 found that the majority of stateless children in Japan were stateless as a result of procedural issues and failures to provide adequate documentation.[78] 

3. Citizenship Stripping

Following the end of the Second World War, and Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean peninsula approximately 52,000 ethnic Koreans were stripped of Japanese citizenship.[79] Some of these individuals were subsequently recorded as overseas nationals of South Korea, while others received the status as Chōsen (partially due to Japan’s rejection of recognising North Korea’s statehood).[80] As noted above, 25,358 persons retain the status of Chōsen as of 31 December 2022.[81]

According to reports in 2026 by Japan’s Immigration Services Agency (Ministry of Justice), at the end of 2024, the number of foreign residents registered as “Chōsen” (North Korea / undivided Korea) was 23,206.[82]

Ethnic Koreans and Taiwanese persons who are Japanese citizens have had their citizenship stripped in some cases.[83]Since Korea and Taiwan ceased to be considered as a part of Japan by the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Japan,[84] the Japanese government issued a notification to Japanese courts that ethnic Koreans and Taiwanese shall be deemed to no longer hold Japanese citizenship unless they have certain special relationships with Japanese nationals.[85] A number of cases have commenced in Japanese courts seeking to retain the Japanese citizenship of affected persons. For example, the Supreme Court of Japan found that a child between a Korean father and Japanese mother, for which the Korean father acknowledged paternity before the amendment of the Nationality Law in 1950 shall obtain Chōsen nationality and lose Japanese nationality.[86] On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Japan found that considering such a child’s paternity was acknowledged after the amendment of the Nationality Law in 1950, before the Treaty of Peace with Japan came into effect in April 1952, they shall not lose their Japanese nationality.[87]

A new amendment to the Nationality Law, which came into force from 1 April 2024,[88] stipulates that a child may be deprived of his or her Japanese citizenship when there is a fact which contradicts the acknowledgment from the father in the case of children born to a non-citizen mother and citizen father. There is no time limit to such deprivation. The amended paragraph is controversial as it jeopardizes the Japanese nationality of certain children and could result in them becoming stateless. There is opposition to the introduction of the new amended, which will add a Paragraph 3[89] to Article 3 of the Law. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has called for action to prevent children becoming stateless such as establishing a limitation period beyond which an acquired nationality cannot be withdrawn.[90]

4. Administrative Barriers

The documents required for application for naturalization, particularly for proving nationality, may present a barrier to accessing citizenship through naturalization. Documents that prove nationality and family relationships of the applicant generally must be issued by a government official of the country of the applicant’s nationality.[91]  This requirement could present a barrier for an applicant who may not possess or be able to obtain an acceptable version of such documentation. This barrier has been exacerbated by tighter screening practices introduced from April 2026, under which authorities may review up to 10 years of residence history and require extended tax and pension records.[92] In addition, applicants are expected to demonstrate a certain level of Japanese proficiency.[93] The application documentation and consultation or interview are conducted in Japanese, and in practice the Legal Affairs Bureau applies an informal benchmark roughly equivalent to JLPT N3 or Japanese elementary school third‑grade level, which may present a barrier for certain applicants.[94]In addition, applicants will be required to demonstrate a certain level of Japanese proficiency[95]. The application documentation and consultation or interview will also be conducted in Japanese, which may present a barrier for certain applicants.[96]

Japan reported a 100% birth registration rate to UNICEF in 2022.[97]

1.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 2.

2.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 2(1).

3.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 2(2).

4.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 2(3).

7.^

Saibanshu Minji No.228 (4 June 2008), page 101 (https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_jp/detail2?id=36416 (available only in Japanese)). 

8.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 3.

9.^

Civil Code (Act No. 89 of 1896) Article 772 (Japan).

10.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 3.

11.^

Acknowledgement can be done by will (igon ninchi) in case the father is deceased.

12.^

Civil Code (Act No. 89 of 1896) (Japan). 

13.^

Study Group on Statelessness in Japan, ‘Typology of Stateless Persons in Japan’ (Report, UNHCR 2017) 18-19. (https://www.unhcr.org/jp/wp-content/uploads/sites/34/2018/01/TYPOLOGY-OF-STATELESS-PERSONS-IN-JAPAN_webEnglish.pdf).

14.^

 Osamu Araki, ‘Statelessness Conventions and Japanese Laws: Convergence and Divergence’ (Report, UNHCR 2015).

15.^

Osamu Araki, ‘Statelessness Conventions and Japanese Laws: Convergence and Divergence’ (Report, UNHCR 2015) (https://www.unhcr.org/jp/wp-content/uploads/sites/34/2017/09/Statelessness_Conventions_and_Japanese_Law_J.pdf)

17.^

Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951) (the “Immigration Act”) Article 24 (Japan).

19.^

Study Group on Statelessness in Japan, ‘Typology of Stateless Persons in Japan’ (Report, UNHCR 2017) 18-19. 

20.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 5.

21.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 5.

22.^

Himari Semans, 'Japan to tighten requirements for naturalization starting April 1' Japan Times (Tokyo, 27 March 2026), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/03/27/japan/politics/japan-new-naturalization-requirements/

23.^

'Japan to tighten requirements for naturalization starting April 1'

24.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 6.

25.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 6(1-3).

26.^

Act Partially Amending the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Act No 56 of 2023) (Japan)

27.^

Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Japan) Act No 28 of 2023 (as amended).

28.^

Human Rights Watch, 'Japan: Immigration Law Creates New Obstacles for Asylum Seekers' (15 June 2023), https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/15/japan-immigration-law-creates-new-obstacles-asylum-seekers

29.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 11(1).

30.^

Nationality Act (Act No. 147 of 1950) (Japan), as amended (the Nationality Law) Article 14.

31.^

Nationality Act (Act No 147 of 1950) (Japan) article 14, as amended by Act Partially Amending the Civil Code (Act No 59 of 2018).

32.^

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the combined tenth and eleventh periodic reports of Japan, 26 September 2018, CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11, available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FJPN%2FCO%2F10-11&Lang=en 

33.^

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the combined tenth and eleventh periodic reports of Japan, 26 September 2018, CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11, available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FJPN%2FCO%2F10-11&Lang=en 

34.^

 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html [accessed 31 May 2023]

35.^

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 Art 1(2) https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280008954&clang=_en

36.^

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 Art 1(2)

37.^

 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Comments of the Japanese Government on the Concluding Observations adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on March 20, 2000, regarding initial and second periodic report of the Japanese Government' (20 March, 2000), https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/comment0110.html

38.^

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 Art 1(3)

39.^

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination – China (including Hong Kong and Macau)’ (64th sess, UN Doc CERD/C/64/CO/2, 10 May 2004); https://www.refworld.org/legal/general/cerd/2004/39027

40.^

Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Japan, 5 March 2019, CRC/C/JPN/CO/4-5, available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FJPN%2FCO%2F4-5&Lang=en 

41.^

Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of Japan, 5 March 2019, CRC/C/JPN/CO/4-5, available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FJPN%2FCO%2F4-5&Lang=en 

42.^

UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html.

43.^

Ministry of Foreign Affair of Japan, ‘Annex: Recommendations accepted for follow-up in the third cycle of the UPR in 2017’, No. 28 (https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100442699.pdf)

44.^

UNHRC, 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Japan' (21 April 2023) UN Doc A/HRC/53/15, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4011757?v=pdf

45.^

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Annex: Recommendations accepted for follow-up in the third cycle of the UPR in 2017 (Report No 28, 2017), https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100442699.pdf

46.^

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, National report submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21 (Report No 103, November 2022), https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100442698.pdf

47.^

UNHCR, 'Japan' (UNHCR Data Finder, 2026), https://www.unhcr.org/where-we-work/countries/japan?dataset=POP&yearsMode=range&selectedYears=%5B2012%2C2026%5D&level=OPR&category=PTY&fundingSource=ALS&compareBy=%5B%22category%22%5D&levelCompare=%5B%5B%22OJPN_ABC%22%5D%5D&viewType=chart&chartType=bar&contextualDataset=BUD&tableDataView=absolute

48.^

UNHCR, 'Japan'

49.^

See UNHCR Global Trends 2021 (June 2022) Annex, Table 5. NB. The figure of 707 stateless persons is included for Japan in the table however UNHCR notes that this figures is an estimate as “The published data refers to end-2020. Statistics for end-2021 have been received by UNHCR and will be published in the coming weeks.  At end-2021 there were a total of 1,508 refugees and 16,709 pending asylum-seekers and 531 stateless people.” The figure of 531 as such has been adopted. 

51.^

Study Group on Statelessness in Japan, ‘Typology of Stateless Persons in Japan’ (Report, UNHCR 2017), (https://www.unhcr.org/jp/wp-content/uploads/sites/34/2018/01/TYPOLOGY-OF-STATELESS-PERSONS-IN-JAPAN_webEnglish.pdf)

56.^

UNHCR, ‘Japan’ (country page, 2025), https://www.unhcr.org/where-we-work/countries/japan

57.^

UNHCR, ‘Japan’

58.^

UNHCR, ‘Japan’

59.^

See Causes of Statelessness Below. 

60.^

Lori Watt, 'Statelessness in East Asia after World War II',’ Stateless Histories, (January 24, 2022) <https://statelesshistories.org/article/post-world-war-ii-east-asia-in-the-global-history-of-statelessness>

61.^

 Lori Watt, 'Statelessness in East Asia after World War II',’ Stateless Histories, (January 24, 2022) <https://statelesshistories.org/article/post-world-war-ii-east-asia-in-the-global-history-of-statelessness>

62.^

Chie Komai and Fumie Azukizawa, 'Stateless persons from Thailand in Japan' [2009] Forced Migration Review <https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/statelessness/komai-azukizawa.pdf>

63.^

UNHCR Global Trends 2022 (June 2023) Annex, Table 5.

64.^

Immigration Services Agency of Japan, ‘Regarding the number of refugees recognized in 2025’ (Press Release, 27 March 2026), https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/publications/press/07_00058.html?lang=en

65.^

UNHCR, The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (https://www.unhcr.org/media/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-and-its-1967-protocol).

66.^

Osamu Arakaki and Wawine Waworuntu Yamashita, ‘Case Note: Tokyo High Court, Judgment, Heisei 30 (Gyou-ko), No 232 (29 January 2020)’ (2020) 2(2) Statelessness & Citizenship Review 317.

67.^

 Japan, Population Census 2020' Table50. Population by Sex and Nationality (Detailed groups)

69.^

South Korea provides statistics on the citizenship of international migrants annually – see KOSIS, 'International Migration of foreigners by sex and citizenship' (2021)

70.^

US Department of State, ‘Japan 2021: Human Rights Report’ (April 2022) 17. See further Rike Lee, ‘Stateless Identity of Korean Diaspora: The Second Generation in Prewar Hawai’i and Postwar Japan’ (2020) 28 Japanese Journal of Policy and Culture 55.

71.^

https://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1682

72.^

E-Stat, ‘Statistics of Foreign Residents (Former Statistics of Registered Foreigners) December 2021 <https://www.e-stat.go.jp/stat-search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00250012&tstat=000001018034&cycle=1&year=20210&month=24101212&tclass1=000001060399> 

73.^

See Abe Kohki, ‘Overview of Statelessness: International and Japanese Context’ (Report, UNHCR 2010); Osamu Araki, ‘Statelessness Conventions and Japanese Laws: Convergence and Divergence’ (Report, UNHCR 2015); Study Group on Statelessness in Japan, ‘Typology of Stateless Persons in Japan’ (Report, UNHCR 2017) fn 17 (and citations listed therein); Chen Tien-Shi, ‘Statelessness in Japan: Management and Challenges’ (2012) 21(1) Journal of Population and Social Studies 70; Sari K Ishii, ‘Access to Citizenship for Abandoned Children: How Migrant’s Children Become “Stateless” in Japanese Orphanages’ (2021) 47(5) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 970; Rike Lee, ‘Stateless Identity of Korean Diaspora: The Second Generation in Prewar Hawai’i and Postwar Japan’ (2020) 28 Japanese Journal of Policy and Culture 55;

74.^

 Ibid.

75.^

Nationality Law No 147 (1950) art  2(3).

76.^

Nationality Law No 147 (1950) art  2(3). 

77.^

See Sari K Ishii, ‘Access to Citizenship for Abandoned Children: How Migrant’s Children Become “Stateless” in Japanese Orphanages’ (2021) 47(5) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 970

78.^

77 Pct of Children Born Stateless in Japan Acquire Nationality’, Nippon (20 July 2021) <https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2021072000521/>.

79.^

Study Group on Statelessness in Japan, ‘Typology of Stateless Persons in Japan’ (Report, UNHCR 2017)137. 

80.^

Study Group on Statelessness in Japan, ‘Typology of Stateless Persons in Japan’ (Report, UNHCR 2017)  138. 

81.^

https://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1682

82.^

Immigration Services Agency of Japan, statistics on foreign residents by nationality (end‑2024), as reported in Stated.jp, ‘在留外国人は過去最多 413 万人、朝鮮籍だけ 10 年連続減’ (2 September 2026), https://stated.jp/posts/chosen-nationality-residents-declining/ 

84.^

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN’ (https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/htmls/B-S38-P2-795.html)

85.^

Notification (tsuutatsu) titled “Regarding the process of nationality and family registration affairs in respect of Koreans, Taiwanese and other nationals in connection with the Treaty of Pease with Japan” as of 19 April 1952 (Ministry of Justice minji kou No. 438).

86.^

Supreme Court, 1st Petty Bench, 12 March 1998 (minshu 52-2-342).

87.^

Supreme Court, 1st Petty Bench, 8 July 2004 (minshu 58-5-1328).

88.^

Act for Partial Amendments of the Civil Code and Other Laws (Act No. 102 of 2022) (https://www.moj.go.jp/content/001386616.pdf (available only in Japanese)).

89.^

Japan Federation of Bar Association, “Statement Calling for Applying the Newly Introduced Article 3, Paragraph 3 of the Nationality Law in a Manner that Gives Maximum Consideration to the Human Rights of Affected Children, and Reviewing the Nationality System as a Whole” (https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/221226.html) 

Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees “Statement Opposing the Establishment of a New Article 3(3) of the Nationality Law by the Bill Amending Part of the Civil Code, etc.” (http://www.jlnr.jp/jlnr/?p=7759 (available only in Japanese))

90.^

UNHCR Comments on the "Bill for Partial Amendments of the Civil Code and Other Laws" submitted to the 210th Diet Session on 14 October 2022 with Regard to the Part Concerning Amendments to Article 3 of the Nationality Law of Japan (https://www.refworld.org/country,,,,JPN,,63610d624,0.html).

92.^

The Japan Times, ‘Japan to tighten requirements for naturalization starting April 1’ (27 March 2026), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/03/27/japan/politics/japan-new-naturalization-requirements/

93.^

VisaJapan, ‘Japan Naturalization Requirements 2026|10‑Year Screening Rule’ (26 November 2025), https://english.visajapan.jp/qa/news20251126.html

94.^

'Japan Naturalization Requirements 2026|10‑Year Screening Rule’