flag

Afghanistan

Last updated : August 15, 2025

Compare with other countries

Digital ID Overview

overview_background_image

While Afghanistan has three key digital ID systems,[25]this report will only focus on two – the e-Tazkira system and the system implemented by the US military.[26]Other digital systems include the Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS), Ministry of Interior and Defense Afghan Personnel and Pay Systems (APPS), the payroll system of the former state intelligence agency, and the payroll system of the Afghan Supreme Court.[27]Launched in May 2018 under former president Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s main digital ID is the electronic version of the Tazkira, known as the e-Tazkira.[28]The e-Tazkira is defined in Afghan law as an “‘official document that is printed on polycarbonate cards and distributed to the citizens of the country pursuant to the provisions of this law’, including biometric information.[29]

The private company contracted for the development of Afghanistan’s e-Tazkira system was Grand Technology Resources (GTR), which touted the system as ‘very secure’ and innovative.[30]The US government, along with the EU and World Bank, also provided some funding in the initial development stages of the e-Tazkira system.[31]The system’s development was then continued under the Afghan government, with India’s Aadhaar system as the model.[32]In 2020, former president Ashraf Ghani deemed the development of an Aadhaar-like system as a top priority for Afghanistan.[33]The development of the e-Tazkira digital ID system was not inclusive of actors outside of the private and government spheres and continued even despite public concerns from civil society. [34]Stakeholders on the ground state that e-Tazkiras was the was one of the most disputed issues in the country, as minority ethnic groups viewed it as a continuation of Pashtun (Pashtuns have historically held dominant political power, a position further reinforced under the current Taliban regime, whose leadership is overwhelmingly Pashtun) hegemony over others. This was largely due to the classification system, which divided ethnic groups such as Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks into multiple subcategories—potentially diminishing the reported population size of these communities. In addition, many of these groups contested being labelled as ‘Afghan’ in the E-Tazkira, arguing that the term specifically refers to the Pashtun ethnic group. Instead, they advocated for their own ethnic identities—Tajik, Hazara, or Uzbek—to be officially recognised in the document, a stance that was largely rejected by the Pashtun community.

According to Section 9(2), it is mandatory for Afghan citizens, both inside and outside Afghanistan to “record their identity and acquire national identity cards.[35]As a functional and foundational ID,[36]the e-Tazkira both manages and certifies identity as well as facilitates access to the same public services as the paper Tazkira.[37]The e-Tazkira is intended to eventually replace paper Tazkiras.[38]Over 6 million e-Tazkiras have been distributed in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover.Limited use of the e-Tazkira system has been attributed to low literacy rates and limited access to technology.[40]

On paper, stateless persons may be able to obtain an e-Tazkira only by providing a copy of the e-Tazkira of a close relative and copies of the e-Tazkira of two Afghan verifiers.[41]However, this process is especially difficult in cases where multiple generations or family members are rendered stateless, depriving them of their right to basic necessities such as health, education, voting, employment, land ownership and other social services linked to the digital ID.[42]Acquiring e-tazkira’s is no easy feat even for citizens due as the process is riddled with corruption, with increasing uncertainty brought on by average wait times of more than 12 months, financial and economic constraints faced by individuals to access them, as well as the requirement to travel distant lands to acquire the same.[43]Today, stakeholders on the ground inform us that the situation has improved in Kabul which has reduced processing times to 1-2 days, and provincial centres with up to two weeks.

Photo by: Nadeem Geelani

The e-Tazkira digital ID system was preceded by an automated biometric identification system (ABIS) introduced by the United States Department of Defense just after the start of US military operations in Afghanistan in 2004.[44]Motives behind the US military’s implementation of the ABIS, a centralized system for biometric data, included establishing ‘identity dominance’ to counter terrorism.[45]This was essentially a tool for US military surveillance, collecting biometric data of anyone deemed as a potential threat to US military operations.[46]Recent estimates show roughly 2.5 million peoples’ biometrics, including fingerprints, iris scans, and photos, had been entered into this system.[47]

Law

law_background_image

Domestic law and policy

Under the Registration of Population Records Act (2014), which covers the implementation of the paper Tazkira, citizens are required to have a paper Tazkira.[48]The Registration of Population Records Act defines the e-Tazkira as “an ‘official document that is printed on polycarbonate cards and distributed to the citizens of the country pursuant to the provisions of this law’, including biometric information.[49]In this domestic legislation, the e-Tazkira is directly linked to citizenship as they are only provided to citizens of Afghanistan and can be used to verify a citizen of Afghanistan based on the included definition of e-Tazkira.[50]There are no mechanisms for filing or resolving complaints included in the Registration of Population Records Act.[51]

Data Protection

Afghanistan does not have a general data protection law. The absence of a data protection framework raises concerns about the protection of sensitive data collected by the government.[52]Civil society organizations expressed concerns over the potential use of biometric and digital ID data being used against “human rights defenders, journalists, and minorities”, calling for the data to be erased and secured at the time of the Taliban takeover.[53] Data attached to the digital ID include home addresses, iris scans, pictures, occupations, names of relatives, and fingerprints.[54]There is a high likelihood, although no concrete evidence, that the biometric data held in the ABIS system of those working with the US government have been breached by the Taliban since the takeover.[55]Some reports have already confirmed breaches in the e-Tazkira system, which suggests that the data can easily be decrypted to gain direct access to this information.[56]While there has not been any direct reports of the use of this sensitive information to target stateless persons, refugees or migrant populations, there is widespread concern of the potential harm that could be caused by those in possession of the data.

With the Taliban takeover, the multitude of leftover digital ID systems implemented for both the Afghan government and foreign governments and militaries left millions of Afghans’ personal data at risk of being used by the Taliban for purposes they were not originally intended for.[58]This is especially of concern considering that the Taliban had used biometric data to target its enemies in 2016 and 2017.[59]In 2015, a technical review of the e-Tazkira system was conducted by Ashraf Ghani which revealed the system to have issues with data processing and security and lack robust testing.[60]

Human Rights Watch notes that these systems should not have been implemented without “a thorough human rights and data protection impact assessment that includes a contextual analysis, an analysis of the technology to be deployed within that context, a system threat model to assess the risk and possible outcomes of system failure, and a data protection and cyber security assessment specific to the Afghanistan context.[61]Further, as the takeover began to take place, there should have been prior reassessments of the security of the stored data.[62]

Given the security risks of the takeover, “all those involved in funding and building these biometric systems” should be transparent about the nature of data that could be breached, the structure and safeguards of the systems, and whether the systems were adapted to changing security concerns in the country.[63]Without transparency, the collection of sensitive biometric data is seen by some as irresponsible and not beneficial to the population it was supposedly made to benefit. [64]

If Afghanistan had a data protection law prior to the Taliban takeover, it could have influenced better practices that may have prevented the Taliban from being able to access personal data stored in the systems after the takeover.[65]

International Commitments

Discrimination resulting from exclusion of stateless persons from accessing forms of identity, whether digital or paper-based, contradicts Article 7 of the UDHR, which protects the principle of non-discrimination.[66]As a party to the ICCPR, Afghanistan is obligated to uphold the right to privacy (Article 17), and the right to be recognized before the law (Article 16).[67]The ICCPR further ensures freedom of movement under Article 12 and freedom of religion under Article 18, both of which are curtailed by the inability to list one’s religion (if non-Muslim) on their Tazkira and restricted freedom of movement for those without a Tazkira.[68]Additionally, Article 8 of the CRC protects the right to an identity, which a significant portion of the population does not have access to.[69]The right to an adequate standard of health is protected by Article 12 of ICESCR to which Afghanistan is a party, along with the right to education (Article 13) and an adequate standard of living, including housing (Article 11).[70]Further, gender discrimination such as discriminatory procedures in procuring identity contradict Afghanistan’s obligations under CEDAW.[71]Due to the exclusion of stateless persons from accessing the Tazkira and e-Tazkira, all of the above mentioned rights which Afghanistan is obligated to as a result of treaty ratification are under threat.Domestic law and policy

Under the Registration of Population Records Act (2014), which covers the implementation of the paper Tazkira, citizens are required to have a paper Tazkira.[48]The Registration of Population Records Act defines the e-Tazkira as “an ‘official document that is printed on polycarbonate cards and distributed to the citizens of the country pursuant to the provisions of this law’, including biometric information.[49]In this domestic legislation, the e-Tazkira is directly linked to citizenship as they are only provided to citizens of Afghanistan and can be used to verify a citizen of Afghanistan based on the included definition of e-Tazkira.[50]There are no mechanisms for filing or resolving complaints included in the Registration of Population Records Act.[51]

Data Protection

Afghanistan does not have a general data protection law. The absence of a data protection framework raises concerns about the protection of sensitive data collected by the government.[52]Civil society organizations expressed concerns over the potential use of biometric and digital ID data being used against “human rights defenders, journalists, and minorities”, calling for the data to be erased and secured at the time of the Taliban takeover.[53]Data attached to the digital ID include home addresses, iris scans, pictures, occupations, names of relatives, and fingerprints.[54]There is a high likelihood, although no concrete evidence, that the biometric data held in the ABIS system of those working with the US government have been breached by the Taliban since the takeover.[55]Some reports have already confirmed breaches in the e-Tazkira system, which suggests that the data can easily be decrypted to gain direct access to this information.[56]While there has not been any direct reports of the use of this sensitive information to target stateless persons, refugees or migrant populations, there is widespread concern of the potential harm that could be caused by those in possession of the data.

With the Taliban takeover, the multitude of leftover digital ID systems implemented for both the Afghan government and foreign governments and militaries left millions of Afghans’ personal data at risk of being used by the Taliban for purposes they were not originally intended for.[58]This is especially of concern considering that the Taliban had used biometric data to target its enemies in 2016 and 2017.[59]In 2015, a technical review of the e-Tazkira system was conducted by Ashraf Ghani which revealed the system to have issues with data processing and security and lack robust testing.[60]

Human Rights Watch notes that these systems should not have been implemented without “a thorough human rights and data protection impact assessment that includes a contextual analysis, an analysis of the technology to be deployed within that context, a system threat model to assess the risk and possible outcomes of system failure, and a data protection and cyber security assessment specific to the Afghanistan context.[61]Further, as the takeover began to take place, there should have been prior reassessments of the security of the stored data.[62]

Given the security risks of the takeover, “all those involved in funding and building these biometric systems” should be transparent about the nature of data that could be breached, the structure and safeguards of the systems, and whether the systems were adapted to changing security concerns in the country.[63]Without transparency, the collection of sensitive biometric data is seen by some as irresponsible and not beneficial to the population it was supposedly made to benefit. [64]

If Afghanistan had a data protection law prior to the Taliban takeover, it could have influenced better practices that may have prevented the Taliban from being able to access personal data stored in the systems after the takeover.[65]

International Commitments

Discrimination resulting from exclusion of stateless persons from accessing forms of identity, whether digital or paper-based, contradicts Article 7 of the UDHR, which protects the principle of non-discrimination.[66]As a party to the ICCPR, Afghanistan is obligated to uphold the right to privacy (Article 17), and the right to be recognized before the law (Article 16).[67]The ICCPR further ensures freedom of movement under Article 12 and freedom of religion under Article 18, both of which are curtailed by the inability to list one’s religion (if non-Muslim) on their Tazkira and restricted freedom of movement for those without a Tazkira.[68]Additionally, Article 8 of the CRC protects the right to an identity, which a significant portion of the population does not have access to.[69]The right to an adequate standard of health is protected by Article 12 of ICESCR to which Afghanistan is a party, along with the right to education (Article 13) and an adequate standard of living, including housing (Article 11).[70]Further, gender discrimination such as discriminatory procedures in procuring identity contradict Afghanistan’s obligations under CEDAW.[71]Due to the exclusion of stateless persons from accessing the Tazkira and e-Tazkira, all of the above mentioned rights which Afghanistan is obligated to as a result of treaty ratification are under threat.[72]




Designed to Include?

The Impact of Digital ID and Legal Identity on Citizenship and Nationality Rights

background_image

Afghanistan needs to be an example of the impact that implementation of digital ID systems can have in illiberal regimes. The Taliban have been clear in their intentions to use the data captured by the digital ID systems, including the e-tazkira, to identify those who worked with the United States and target “threats”. [73]Between 2016-2017, it has been reported that the extremist group have misused digital ID systems, specifically fingerprints and iris scans of those they consider enemies in buses and killed them.[74]It has created immense security risks for marginalized groups, such as the LGBTQIA+ community, women, activists, journalists, and others who may have supported or assisted foreign troops previously.[75]

There is exclusion from accessing the digital ID in Afghanistan due to a variety of reasons, with financial barriers being the primary reason. Other challenges also include the barriers faced by women to obtain official documentation as well as those residing in remote areas that are disproportionately affected due to the shutdown of local offices which increases travel time and financial burdens.[76]Exclusion from the Tazkira exacerbates the risk of statelessness as well as significantly infringes on the rights and access to services of stateless persons.[77]Denial of the Tazkira causes discrimination, marginalization, and even the denial of citizenship and statelessness.[78]Without an identity, individuals are unable to confirm their status as citizens if they previously had citizenship status, which is in direct violation of the Constitution, which does not allow for any Afghan citizen to be “deprived of citizenship or sentenced to domestic or foreign exile”.[79]Those without a Tazkira, including stateless persons, experience lack of access to employment and humanitarian aid, and exclusion from healthcare, education, property rights, a bank account, and loans.[80]Freedom of movement is considerably restricted, especially for women, between provinces, districts, and even villages without a Tazkira.[81] Without a Tazkira, children cannot enroll in school.[82]The inability of children without a Tazkira to enroll in school violates Article 43 of the Constitution, which protects the right to education for all citizens.[83]In order for children in Afghanistan to get  Tazkira, their father must also have a Tazkira.[84]For children whose father is absent, or whose father is stateless or without documentation, it is difficult to impossible to obtain a Tazkira.[85]The lack of a Tazkira is also socially stigmatized and often leads to further discrimination. [86]

Preceding the launch of the e-Tazkira, there was a five year delay due to debates and serious opposition surrounding whether ethnicity or nationality should be noted on the digital ID.[87]Critics of listing ‘Afghan’ for nationality felt that it would refer to one of the ethnic groups of Afghanistan rather than to citizenship.[88]Others felt that if one does not accept their nationality as ‘Afghan’, they “should leave the country”.[89]

In terms of Afghanistan’s digital ID increasing inclusion, the ability to apply for the e-Tazkira online has increased registration among women, accounting for 47% of new registrations.[90] The National Internally Displaced Persons Policy (2013) recognizes government responsibility for ensuring and promoting issuance of e-Tazkiras to IDPs, which can but does not directly include stateless persons.[91] In order to increase inclusivity, there should be more direct and accessible pathways for stateless persons to obtain Tazkiras. Furthermore, those responsible for creating biometric data systems in Afghanistan, “including the US government, the European Union, UN agencies, and the World Bank, should make public the kinds of data lost or potentially seized by the Taliban” and what safeguards were put in place for the protection of data and human rights in these systems.[92]Overall, the case of Afghanistan is a pivotal learning opportunity for the commitment required for the right to privacy to be upheld in digital ID systems implemented in “conflict zones, fragile spaces, or humanitarian settings”.[93]



References
5.^
International Organization of Migration, ‘Documentation and Legal Identification in Afghanistan: Research Report’ (Afghanistan IOM, 2023) <https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1071/files/documents/2023-08/documentation-and-legal-identification-in-afghanistan_0_0.pdf> accessed 8 July 2024.
6.^
International Organization of Migration, ‘Documentation and Legal Identification in Afghanistan: Research Report’ (Afghanistan IOM, 2023) <https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1071/files/documents/2023-08/documentation-and-legal-identification-in-afghanistan_0_0.pdf> accessed 8 July 2024.
8.^
 LandInfo Country of Origin Information Centre, ‘Afghanistan: Tazkera, passports and other ID Documents’ (Landinfo, 22 May 2019) <https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Afghanistan-Tazkera-passports-and-other-ID-documents-22052019-final.pdf> (accessed 8 July 2024).
13.^
International Organization of Migration, ‘Documentation and Legal Identification in Afghanistan: Research Report’ (Afghanistan IOM, 2023) <https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1071/files/documents/2023-08/documentation-and-legal-identification-in-afghanistan_0_0.pdf> accessed 8 July 2024.
38.^

​​LandInfo Country of Origin Information Centre, ‘Afghanistan: Tazkera, passports and other ID Documents’ (Landinfo, 22 May 2019) <https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Afghanistan-Tazkera-passports-and-other-ID-documents-22052019-final.pdf> (accessed 8 July 2024). 

41.^

Signpost Project, ‘Steps To Obtain an E-Tazkira (NID Card) in Kabul Province’ (Beporsed, 22 Oct 2023) <https://www.beporsed.org/en-us/articles/11388492263069> accessed 8 July 2024.

42.^

Signpost Project, ‘Steps To Obtain an E-Tazkira (NID Card) in Kabul Province’ (Beporsed, 22 Oct 2023) <https://www.beporsed.org/en-us/articles/11388492263069> accessed 8 July 2024.

51.^

Registration of Population Records Act (2014)

52.^

Ghulam Shabir Arain, ‘Afghanistan Navigates Controversies on digital identity journey’ (Biometric Update, 2 Jul 2024) <https://www.biometricupdate.com/202407/afghanistan-navigates-controversies-on-digital-identity-journey> accessed 8 July 2024.

56.^

 Jim Nash, ‘The latest lesson on biometric data privacy could cost people’s lives’ (Biometric Update, 3 Jan 2023) <https://www.biometricupdate.com/202301/the-latest-lesson-on-biometric-data-privacy-could-cost-peoples-lives> accessed 8 July 2024.

66.^

 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 7.

67.^

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 16, 17

68.^

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 12; ‘Legal Identity and Civil Documentation in Afghanistan’ (n 1).

69.^

Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC) art 8; LandInfo Country of Origin Information Centre, ‘Afghanistan: Tazkera, passports and other ID Documents’ (Landinfo, 22 May 2019) <https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Afghanistan-Tazkera-passports-and-other-ID-documents-22052019-final.pdf> (accessed 8 July 2024).

70.^

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) art 11, 12, 13. 

71.^

 Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 19 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW)

79.^

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Afghanistan’ UN Doc CEDAW/C/AFG/CO/3 (10 march 2020) [37]-[38]; The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004) Article 28.

87.^

LandInfo Country of Origin Information Centre, ‘Afghanistan: Tazkera, passports and other ID Documents’ (Landinfo, 22 May 2019) <https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Afghanistan-Tazkera-passports-and-other-ID-documents-22052019-final.pdf> (accessed 8 July 2024).

See Statelessness Overview
Footer design