Legal Identity

The majority of states in South Asia rely on national identity cards or citizenship certificates as their officially recognized proofs of legal identity. Birth registration alone does not constitute legal identity, but it is an essential document required to access primary legal identity and its corresponding digital ID systems. Three countries in the sub-region face challenges as a result of low birth registration rates. In 2016 India reported 20% of children did not have access to birth certificates,^[1] Nepal’s birth registration rate stood at 73% in 2022,^[2] and Bangladesh’s registration rate was 83% in 2023.^[3] Sri Lanka stands out with its near-universal birth registration rates reaching 97% in 2019.^[4]

Birth registration typically provides the foundational civil record, after which the state issues a formal identity document: national identity card or citizenship certificate. This serves as the operative proof used to access other identity documents (national identity cards, citizenship certificates) and public or private services. There are alternative documents to birth registration as proof of legal identity, as in the case of Nepal, a recommendation from the designated local government authority can be submitted instead to acquire a citizenship certificate.^[5],

In seven out of the eight countries in the sub region (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), national identity cards or citizenship certificates are issued to establish legal identity based on proof of birth registration or alternative documents. In Sri Lanka, alternative documents such as documents certifying the person’s name and date of birth, such as school leaving certificate, estate leaving certificate, marriage certificate, citizenship certificate can be provided instead of birth certificates to apply for national identity cards.^[6]

India, however, does not have one officially recognized legal identity document. Instead it relies on birth registration as a foundational identity document to establish citizenship even though its birth registration rates have lagged.^[7]

Table 1: Primary Legal Identity Document and the Documents Needed to Apply for it across South Asia

Country	Primary Legal Identity Document	Documents Needed
Bhutan	Citizenship Identity Card or an identification document issued by Department of Civil Registration and Census	Birth registration
India	None	Birth registration
Nepal	Citizenship certificate	Birth registration
Sri Lanka	National Identity Card (NIC)	Citizenship certificate, birth registration, or other documents certifying the person’s name and date of birth.
Bangladesh	National ID card (NID)	Birth certificate, a passport or a citizenship declaration form, , a copy of parents’ NID cards or birth certificate or citizenship certificate. of parents.^[8]
Maldives	National ID card	Birth registration
Pakistan	Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) for adults above 18 year of age. B-form (Child Registration Certificate) for children under 18 years of age.	To apply for B-form, the birth registration and the CNIC of at least one parent. To apply for a CNIC, the CNIC of a parent or close relative, and a Computerized Identity Card Form.
Afghanistan	National identity cards called the Tazkira (paper) and e-Tazkira (digital).	Birth registration is a supporting, but not required, document for obtaining a Tazkira. Instead, the process requires an application form, photographs, an attestation of identity, and the Tazkira of a relative.

Digital ID Overview

Across South Asia, all eight countries have developed national digital ID systems as part of broader legal identity frameworks that allow citizens to participate in economic, social, and governmental activities The effectiveness of a digital ID systems depends on factors such as the country’s legal framework, technological infrastructure, and accessibility to legal identity documents.^[9] In many countries, the transition from traditional paper-based identity documents to centralised digital IDs has improved access to government services. However, access to these digital ID systems and the services typically require proof of citizenship. This prerequisite leads to the exclusion of non-citizens and marginalised populations, including stateless persons.

Digital IDs in the South Asia sub-region are predominantly foundational in nature (with the exception of Nepal).^[10] They function as the primary credentials that establish legal identity. They have also been instrumental in eliminating duplication in identity records across government departments. Digital IDs enable access to multiple government and private services. These systems are typically linked to civil registration databases, with enrolment contingent upon proof of birth registration or citizenship certificate.

Table 2: Digital ID System and its Key Features across South Asia countries

Country	Digital ID System	Key Features
Bhutan	National Digital ID – 2022	The National Digital ID is Asia’s first decentralised Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) system. It serves as a foundational ID connecting citizens, government, and the private sector.
India	Aadhaar Digital ID – 2009	Aadhaar is a functional ID system integrating biometric data with service access. It provides a universal identification number linked to multiple services, including subsidies and financial transactions.
Nepal	National ID Card (NID) – 2016	The National ID Card functions as a functional ID. It is designed to eventually replace the Citizenship Certificate while facilitating access to public services.
Sri Lanka	e-NIC (digital version) – 2012	The e-NIC is a foundational ID system with mandatory registration requirements. It mirrors the paper NIC system in certifying legal identity and enabling access to public and private services.
Bangladesh	National ID Card (NID) – 2009	The National ID Card is a foundational and functional ID using biometric-based authentication. It is integrated with banking, telecommunications, and other public services through a centralized national database.
Maldives	eFaas Digital ID – 2012	The eFaas is a foundational ID enabling users to verify their identity digitally and access government services such as healthcare, employment portals, and business transactions.
Pakistan	Computerised National Identity Card (CNIC) – 2025	The CNIC is a foundational ID that both proves and constitutes Pakistani citizenship. It serves as the official recognition of an individual’s citizenship status.
Afghanistan	Tazkira (paper) and e-Tazkira – 2018	The e-Tazkira is both a functional and foundational ID that manages and certifies identity. It enables access to the same public services available under the paper Tazkira system.

While some states legally define digital IDs as voluntary, they are effectively mandatory in practice. Possession of the national digital ID is required to access essential services such as banking, healthcare, education, and welfare benefits (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka). In most countries, digital ID systems also act as markers of citizenship, determining eligibility for rights and entitlements. They thereby exclude refugees, foreign citizens, and stateless persons from participation in digital governance.

Moreover, access to digital IDs remains highly uneven across different countries in the sub-region. In Afghanistan, decades of conflict, displacement, and administrative fragmentation have severely limited access to the Tazkiras and e-Tazkiras. In Nepal and India, citizenship documentation is required for digital ID enrolment.^[11] This prerequisite results in the exclusion of people who have difficulty accessing citizenship such as children of single mothers and persons of undetermined nationality amongst others.. In Bhutan, only citizens listed in the national census are eligible for a Citizenship Identity Card.^[12] As the Bhutanese Lhotshampa population are excluded from the national census they are effectively stateless.^[13] Similar challenges exist in Pakistan and Bangladesh, where the Rohingya refugees and other minority groups are often denied registration.^[14] The Maldives operates under a relatively more inclusive policy framework allowing foreigners or work permit holders to access the eFaas with proof of their passport or work permit number.^[15]

Implementation of digital identity systems across South Asia is largely state-driven, with governments leading the design and rollout, often supported by private technology partners or international development agencies. In Bangladesh, for example, the World Bank provided technical assistance to the Election Commission and other government agencies to develop the regulatory and policy framework as well as the technology required for the NID system.^[16] Generally, public consultation and independent oversight in these processes remain limited in South Asia. There is little evidence of participation from civil society or affected communities. As a result, digital identity frameworks across the sub-region tend to replicate existing inequalities in citizenship and documentation, further entrenching the exclusion of stateless persons and marginalised populations from legal identity and essential services.

Law

Domestic Law and Policy

Only five out of the eight countries in South Asia (Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan) have domestic laws and policies that define digital identity. Even among these five, the legal definitions of digital IDs, the extent to which they establish digital identity and citizenship, vary significantly in scope and substance.

Countries in this sub-region generally draw on two approaches when mapping digital ID legislation: some establish new legislation for their digital ID system (an example is Pakistan’s recent Digital Nation Pakistan Act (2025), while others adopt or amend existing laws around civil registration systems to incorporate digital or biometric elements (for example, Sri Lanka’s Registration of Persons amendment).^[17]

In countries that have legal definitions, digital identity is typically defined as a state-issued identifier that links demographic – and often biometric data – to an individual for authentication and access to services. In practice, some countries set out a clear statutory definition in dedicated digital-ID laws (for example Pakistan). While other countries only define digital identity in operational or technical terms within national ID instruments (such as India’s Aadhaar system; Bhutan’s Citizenship ID). The nature of how legal identities are defined appears to affect whether countries have legal grievance mechanisms for digital-ID related complaints. Countries like Pakistan, with dedicated digital ID laws, have explicit grievance addressing mechanisms. Whereas, other countries rely on amendments to civil registration laws offering more limited avenues for complaints.^[18]

Legal frameworks in almost all South Asian countries explicitly or implicitly link digital ID to citizenship. In a number of countries (Afghanistan’s Tazkira; Bangladesh’s national ID; Nepal’s citizenship certificate), the digital ID is issued on the basis of citizenship or civil-registration records, and therefore functions as both identity and proof of nationality.^[19] In other cases (India’s Adhaar), having a digital ID does not confer citizenship but access to Aadhaar relies on citizenship documentation, so then digital IDs operate as a marker for citizenship along with its access to services.^[20]

Data Protection

In South Asia, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, have policy and laws governing data protection and privacy. With the exception of Bhutan, the data protection legal and policy framework in India, Nepal and Sri Lanka do not provide explicit safeguards to protect personal information or data within Digital ID systems. In Bhutan, the National Digital Identity (NDI) framework, by contrast, contains in-built data protection provisions. It emphasises user control and consent, stores facial data with the Ministry of Home Affairs for anti-fraud purposes. It requires that all stored information be encrypted and accessed only with the user’s consent.^[21] In the other countries there are no equivalent no data encryption requirements, or adequate safeguards for the protection of the storage, use, and access to data.

There are major concerns and policy gaps around privacy, surveillance, and exclusion from access to public services across South Asia. In India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, there have been major breaches of personal data from digital ID databases being accessed or exposed through unauthorized methods.

For instance, Bangladesh documented two significant data breaches within a single year in 2022- 2023.^[22]

There is growing concern regarding the use of digital ID systems and its biometric databases for surveillance and monitoring, particularly in countries where civic spaces are shrinking. In the Maldives, the collection of indirect data such as IP addresses and information generated when people use their eFaas ID, have raised fears that human rights defenders are increasingly being targeted for state monitoring surveillance, harassment, and threats of violence.^[23] In Afghanistan, there are significant risks of personal and biometric being used by the Taliban for unauthorised purposes. Human rights groups have criticized the rollout of the e-Tazkira in the absence of a comprehensive human rights and data protection impact assessment.^[24] In Sri Lanka, civil society groups have raised concerns that all-encompassing digital ID systems may enable mass surveillance.^[25]

International Commitments

No country in South Asia is a party to any international treaty that defines or regulates digital ID.

Some countries have undertaken voluntary initiatives to increase proliferate the use of digital IDs. For example, India has made a non-binding commitment to provide legal identity (including birth registration) to all Indians by 2030, as part of achieving Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals.^[26] Pakistan participates in forums related to the Identification for Development Initiative (ID4D) by the World Bank. It seeks to ensure all its people have full access to digital ID-based services.^[27]

Furthermore, no country in South Asia has ratified The 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions. Only Afghanistan in the sub region has ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol. All South Asian countries, however, are party to at least one core human rights treaty such as CRC or CEDAW. Both treaties create legal obligations that are tied to the access to Digital ID systems in the country. For example, in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Bangladesh, individuals are required to present birth registration or a national identity card when enrolling in school. This requirement creates hindrances in allowing the State to fulfil its obligation to uphold children’s right to education under the CRC.^[28] Similarly, in Afghanistan, documentation requirements linked to the Tazkira and e-Tazkira system have resulted in restrictions on movement and religious expression, particularly for women and non-Muslim communities. This curtailment of basic freedom violates the country’s obligations under the ICCPR and CEDAW to ensure freedom of religion, movement and prohibit gender based discrimination.^[29] In Pakistan the exclusion of stateless persons to ID services, results in violations of state obligations under the ICESCR, ICCPR, CEDAW and CERD.^[30]

Designed to Include?

The Impact of Digital ID and Legal Identity on Citizenship and Nationality Rights

Generally, digital IDs have not reduced statelessness. In many instances they have in fact, reinforced barriers that stateless persons face in accessing services. The fundamental reason for this is that in most countries national the prerequisite for obtaining digital ID is proof of birth registration or citizenship (as seen in India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka). Therefore, possession of the digital ID functions as a practical marker of nationality and access to services rather than a solution to address statelessness.

There are administrative barriers in obtaining citizenship certificates and birth registration, which then prevents stateless persons from being able to apply for a national identity card (NIC). In Sri Lanka birth registration requires the details of both parents and at least one parent’s NIC. This requirement prevents children with stateless parents who lack NICs from applying.^[31] Similarly in Bhutan, for non-residents to register births, they must apply for a special resident card, which requires proof of their own citizenship along with the citizenship of their mother and father.^[32] In Afghanistan to obtain a Tazkiras one needs to furnish documents such as: proof of parentage, a male chaperone, and religious conformity. Many groups such as women, non-Muslims, nomadic tribes, internally displaced peoples (due to reasons of conflict or natural calamities) do not engage with the process of civil registration due to fears of religious persecution.^[33]

A few countries have undertaken targeted measures to increase access to digital IDs. For example, Pakistan deploys NADRA mobile units to increase access to registration in rural and hard to reach areas.^[34] However, such initiatives are generally not obligated by law. Thus they are prone to risks of inconsistency. Such initiatives at lager scales are vital to meaningfully address systemic barriers to digital ID access.

Some digital ID systems such as the one implemented in India, not only excludes stateless persons, but risks excluding citizens and residents as well, with its technical and logistical vulnerabilities that has restricted eligible individuals from receiving and accessing essential services.^[35] These challenges were particularly evident in the Public Distribution System, where fingerprint authentication was mandated for ration collection.^[36] Aadhaar-related errors such as biometric mismatches, connectivity failures, and lack of linkage contributed to the exclusion of over 2 million people from accessing essential food supplies between November 2017 and February 2018.^[37]

Summary Table

The table summarises the types of legal IDs available, whether their digital IDs are foundational or functional, whether they have data protection laws, the voluntary nature of their digital IDs, access to digital IDs for stateless persons or refugees, and the international core human rights treaties ratified in the South Asia sub-region.

Country	Legal ID (Type)	Digital ID (Foundational/Functional)	Domestic Laws & Policy Covering Digital ID	Data Protection Law	Digital ID Mandatory?	Access for Stateless/Refugees	Intl. Treaty Ratified (Data/Human Rights)
Bhutan	Birth Registration, Citizenship Identity Card, National Digital ID	Foundational	Yes: National Digital Identity Act of Bhutan (2023)	Yes	No	No	CRC, CEDAW
India	Birth Registration, Aadhaar Digital ID	Functional	Yes: Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act (2016)	Yes	No	No	ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CRC, and CEDAW
Nepal	Citizenship certificate, National ID card (NID)	Functional	Yes: Nepal’s National ID and Civil Registration Act (2020); National ID and Civil Registration Regulations (2021)	Yes	Yes	No	ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CRC, and CEDAW.
Sri Lanka	National Identity Card (NIC), e-NIC (digital version)	Foundational	No	Yes	Yes	No	ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CRC, and CEDAW.
Bangladesh.	National ID card (NID).	Foundational and Functional.	No	No	No	No	ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CRC, and CEDAW
Maldives	National ID card, eFaas digital ID	Foundational	No	No	No	No	ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CRC, and CEDAW
Pakistan	Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) for above adults above 18 years of age; B-form (Child Registration Certificate) for children below 18 years of age.	Foundational	Yes: Digital Nation Pakistan Act (2025)	No	Yes	No	ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CRC, and CEDAW
Afghanistan	National identity cards called the Tazkira (paper) and e-Tazkira (digital).	Foundational and Functional	Yes: Registration of Population Records Act (2014)	No	Yes	Yes in theory but it has many difficulties in practice	1951 Refugee, ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CRC, and CEDAW

References

1.^

Government of India, ‘Birth Registration | Social Welfare’ (7 August 2025) <https://socialwelfare.vikaspedia.in/viewcontent/social-welfare/important-documents-for-indian-citizens/birth-registration?lgn=en> accessed 7 August 2025.

2.^

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3.^

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4.^

Calum Handforth and Matther Wilson, ‘“Digital Identity Country Report: Sri Lanka”’ (GSM Association 2019) <https://www.gsma.com/solutions-and-impact/connectivity-for-good/mobile-for-development/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Digital-Identity-Country-Report-Sri-Lanka.pdf>.

5.^

‘Nepal: Vital Documents and Identification’ (January 2024) <https://iamhere.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/minisites/iamhere/pdf/case3402583i-am-here-nepal.pdf?rev=32197328f0fd4615948a70a6d4b1e2cc&sc_lang=en> accessed 17 November 2025.

6.^

‘The Government Information Center’ <http://www.gic.gov.lk/gic/index.php/en/component/info/?id=2441&task=info> accessed 16 December 2025..

7.^

‘“Without an Aadhaar Card Nothing Could Be Done”: A Mixed Methods Study of Biometric Identification and Birth Registration for Children in Varanasi, India’ [2025] ResearchGate <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347143942_'Without_an_Aadhaar_card_nothing_could_be_done'_a_mixed_methods_study_of_biometric_identification_and_birth_registration_for_children_in_Varanasi_India> accessed 13 November 2025; Atharv Dhiman and Imke Harbers, ‘Legal Identity at the Margins: The Impact of Violent Conflict on Birth Registration in India’ (2023) 27 Citizenship Studies 779.

8.^

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9.^

‘Report: Digital Identification Systems in South and Southeast Asia – EngageMedia’ (2023) <https://engagemedia.org/2023/gif-report-digital-identification-systems/> accessed 17 November 2025.

10.^

‘Annual Progress Report (Fiscal Year 2023/24)’ (Department of National ID and Civil Registration, Nepal).

11.^

Protection Cluster, Afganistan (UNHCR), ‘Legal Identity and Civil Documentation in Afghanistan’ (UNHCR 2025) <https://globalprotectioncluster.org/emergencies/82/Afghanistan> accessed 15 August 2025; The National ID and Civil Registration Act (2020) Article 4; The Constitution of Nepal (2015) Article 51(f)7.; ‘List of Documents Required For Aadhar Card Update Online and Offline’ (Compare & Apply Loans & Credit Cards in India- Paisabazaar.com, 7 November 2024) <https://www.paisabazaar.com/aadhar-card/documents-required-for-aadhar-card/> accessed 17 January 2025.

12.^

Durga M Sengupta, ‘Guess Who’s Getting the World’s First Self-Sovereign National Digital ID’’ (Rest of the World, 6 September 2023) <https://restofworld.org/2023/south-asia-newsletter-bhutan-national-digital-id> accessed 10 July 2024.

13.^

‘Bhutan, Statelessness Encyclopedia Asia Pacific (SEAP)’ (Nationality For All 2025) <https://seap.nationalityforall.org/region/regional-overview/south-asia/bhutan/>.

14.^

‘Register - eFaas’ <https://efaas.egov.mv/account/verify> accessed 13 November 2025; ‘Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations on the Eighth Periodic Report of Bangladesh’ CEDAW/C/BGD/CO/8 <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FBGD%2FCO%2F8&Lang=en>.

15.^

‘Register - eFaas’ <https://efaas.egov.mv/account/verify> accessed 13 November 2025.

16.^

Shruti Trikanad, ‘State of Digital Identification Systems in South and Southeast Asia’ (2023) <https://engagemedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Report-on-the-State-of-Digital-Identification-in-South-and-Southeast-Asia-2023.pdf.>.

17.^

‘Pakistan: Digital Nation Pakistan Act 2025 Establishing the Digital Authority Enters into Force’ (Digital Policy Alert) <https://digitalpolicyalert.org/event/26626-digital-nation-pakistan-act-2025-establishing-the-digital-authority-enters-into-force>; The Registration of Persons (Amendment) Act (2016).

18.^

‘NADRA Launches Centralized Complaint Management System for Citizens’ (National Database and Registration Authority, Ministry of Interior, Pakistan, 8 February 2022) <https://www.nadra.gov.pk/mediaRelease/nadra-launches-centralized-complaint-management-system-for-citizens-ba50a4ff> accessed 5 August 2025.

19.^

‘Documentation and Legal Identification in Afghanistan’ (The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Afghanistan; Samuel Hall 2023) <https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1071/files/documents/2023-08/documentation-and-legal-identification-in-afghanistan_0_0.pdf>; ‘“Bangladesh NID Application System: Frequently Asked Question”’ <https://nidcardonlinecheckbd.com/common-questions-and-their-answers-about-the-bangladesh-nid/>; Ghulam Shabir Arain, ‘Nepal’s Digital Identity Transformation Fosters Challenges’ (Biometric Update, 4 June 2024) <https://www.biometricupdate.com/202406/nepals-digital-identity-transformation-fosters-challenges> accessed 24 January 2025.

20.^

The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act 2016; The Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations 2016.

21.^

Monica Rai, ‘How Does the National Digital Identity System Ensure Privacy and Security for All Citizens’ The Bhutanese (21 October 2023).

22.^

Daryna Antoniuk, ‘Bangladesh Government Fixes Website That Leaked Personal Data of 50 Million Citizens’ The Record (11 July 2023); Mohiuddin Alamgir, ‘Smart NID Data Leak: Voters’ Info Now in Telegram Channel’ The Daily Star (5 October 2023) <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/smart-nid-data-leak-voters-info-now-telegram-channel-3435186> accessed 26 September 2024.

23.^

Trikanad (n 21).

24.^

‘New Evidence That Biometric Data Systems Imperil Afghans | Human Rights Watch’ (30 March 2022) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/30/new-evidence-biometric-data-systems-imperil-afghans> accessed 12 November 2025.

25.^

Charya Samarakoon and Bhavani Fonseka, ‘Right to Privacy in Sri Lanka’ (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2020) Discussion Paper <https://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Discussion-Paper-Right-to-Privacy-updated-draft-4-1.pdf> accessed 12 November 2025.

26.^

‘Localising SDGs: Early Lessons from India 2019’ (NITI Aayog 2019) <https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2020-07/LSDGs_July_8_Web.pdf> accessed 12 November 2025.

27.^

‘Identification for Development (ID4D) 2020 Annual Report (English)’ (Identification for Development Washington, DC : World Bank Group) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/625371611951876490>.

28.^

ANM Zakir Hossain, ‘Educational Crisis of Rohingya Refugee Children in Bangladesh: Access, Obstacles, and Prospects to Formal and Non-Formal Education’ (2023) 9 Heliyon e18346; Handforth and Wilson (n 4); ‘Vital Statistics Report of Maldives: 2019-2021.’

29.^

Protection Cluster, Afghanistan (UNHCR) (n 13).

30.^

Humera Iqbal, Anushay Malik and Maria Rashid, ‘Suspended Identity: Statelessness, Citizenship Challenges and the Impermanence of Identity Status Faced by Pakistani Bengalis’ (2025) 29 Citizenship Studies 159.

31.^

Handforth and Wilson (n 4).

32.^

‘Citizenship Identity/Special Resident Card Application Form For Those Reporting for the First Time’ (Bhutan Ministry of Home Affairs Department of Civil Registration and Census) <https://dcrc.moha.gov.bt/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/New-CID_SR-Card-Application-Form-English-18-above.pdf>.

33.^

‘Documentation and Legal Identification in Afghanistan’ (n 23).

34.^

‘NADRA, PBS Sign MoU to Use Data Domestically, Internationally’ <https://www.nation.com.pk/22-Oct-2024/nadra-pbs-sign-mou-to-use-data-domestically-internationally> accessed 12 November 2025.

35.^

Ekta Anuradha and others, ‘A Critical Study of India’s Digital India Policy and Its Socio-Humanitarian Implications’ (2025) 7 Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (JHASS) 54.

36.^

‘2 Million People Deprived Of Ration Per Month Due To Aadhaar Related Problems: Report - The Logical Indian’ (18 May 2018) <https://thelogicalindian.com/2-million-people-ration-aadhaar/> accessed 16 December 2025.

37.^

ibid.

See Statelessness Overview