In the 21st century, there has been a massive shift in priority away from traditional Civil Registration and Vital Statistics (CRVS) systems towards digital identity (digital ID) systems for many development actors.[1] The World Bank’s Identification for Development (ID4D) Initiative, established in 2014, was a crucial catalyst to “help countries realize the transformational potential of digital identification systems to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals [SDGs]”.[2] The United Nations and other development actors have also characterized digital ID as having ‘transformative’ potential to increase the convenience and efficiency of public and private services, and to achieve SDG 16.9, to “provide legal identity for all, including birth registration” by 2030.[3] Digital ID systems are a foundational part of digital public infrastructure (DPI), which is a structure that enables governments to deliver services digitally to the public.[4] As governments establish DPI to deliver services through a streamlined, digital platform, creating digital ID systems allow them to verify the public’s identities to securely deliver such services.[5] Through ID4D, the World Bank has played a major role in many countries’ DPI development, including digital ID system design and implementation, largely through assistance with “analytics, assessments, and funding”.[6] Between 2015 and 2020, the World Bank’s initiatives provided over 60 countries support in establishing digital ID systems.[7]
While digital ID systems, as an integral part of DPI, have the potential to streamline public and private services and increase efficiency of government service delivery, without principles of human rights built into its design, they can also amplify the exclusion, discrimination and inequality that exists in traditional CRVS systems. [8] In a 2020 UNHCR analysis on emerging digital technologies and the right to privacy, a key finding was “that emerging digital technologies exacerbate and compound existing inequities, many of which exist along racial, ethnic and national origin grounds”.[9] The analysis notes that “without stringent protections, digital identification systems for public services disproportionately exclude racial and ethnic minorities, especially those whose citizenship status is insecure”.[10] Lack of transparency of how digital ID systems are designed and who is consulted in the process makes it difficult for civil society to monitor for potential exclusion or discrimination, putting the onus for regulating the systems on governments.[11] Further, digital ID systems store user data, often including biometrics such as photos and fingerprints which are highly sensitive and have the potential to put people at risk if that data is leaked or used for purposes beyond identity verification.[12] In many countries’ regulatory frameworks for digital ID systems, data collected for such systems is set to be used for specified purposes beyond identity verification, such as national security, which could lead to surveillance of immigrant populations, refugees, and stateless people.[13] One of the 10 Principles of the ID4D Initiative is to “ensure universal access for individuals, free from discrimination”, yet many states’ require citizenship in order to access a digital ID, excluding stateless people. [14]
Nationality for All (NFA), through its Third Edition has expanded the Statelessness Encyclopedia Asia Pacific (SEAP) in an effort to begin filling the gap in available information on how digital ID systems are designed in the Asia Pacific region, particularly how they impact stateless people. The application of digital ID systems typically focuses on citizens, which has also been the case in Asia Pacific, which often results in citizenship centric digital ID systems. This reinforces the systematic exclusion that often prevents stateless people from accessing essential services including healthcare, education, a bank account, and employment. Digital ID discourse is also often highly technical and inaccessible. As digital ID systems develop rapidly across the region, critical analysis of the impact of these systems on marginalized groups has been slow to catch up. Uncertainty surrounding the design of these systems, the lack of legal and policy frameworks set in place prior to developing them, and the lack of public knowledge of the implications of such systems are serious concerns.
Beyond knowledge production, combatting the lack of transparency in digital ID systems’ design and implementation requires shared principles, positions, and standards for what characteristics they should ideally have. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a law of the European Union, is the standard legal framework for how to ensure protection of personal data in digital ID systems.[15] While the GDPR’s compliance guidelines are widely followed, it is difficult to monitor government compliance with respect to digital ID systems due to the lack of transparency of their characteristics and the lack of comprehensive legal and policy frameworks behind them.[16] Another framework is UNDP’s Digital Legal ID Governance Framework for governments and civil society actors, which provides recommendations for rights based, inclusive digital identity systems.[17] The Human Rights for Digital ID (HR4ID) Coalition, “a community of civil society organizations and researchers from across the globe advocating to diminish the negative impacts of digital identity on individuals and communities”, has also adopted a common position on mandatory digital ID systems.[18] With a focus on systems that either have mandatory enrollment, or mandatory use (required to access essential services such as health care), the common position includes:
- “Mandatory digital ID requirements negatively impact human rights/human life, particularly for those who are marginalized or vulnerable.”
- “Public institutions should not require mandatory enrollment in a digital ID system.”
- “Public institutions should not require mandatory use of elements of the digital ID system to access public services or privately provided public services.”
- “In contexts where digital ID systems already exist or are in development, the State has an obligation to guarantee there are accessible, non-digital alternatives available for those who are unable to enroll or use the digital ID.”
NFA hopes that this research can contribute to as well as question these common positions and shared principles on how to ensure nondiscrimination, equity and protection of human rights in digital ID systems.
Methodology
The NFA Research team designed a standardized research framework to ensure consistency and comparability across all factsheets. We developed a uniform questionnaire in-house, outlining key thematic areas such as Legal Identity, legal frameworks, policy implementation, population impact,
and gaps in the protection of stateless and at-risk populations. This questionnaire guided the structure and scope of all data collection. Although not uniform, some elements of primary research have been incorporated based on the contributions to the NFA team by stakeholders. We also undertook an extensive review of secondary sources, including domestic legislation, policy documents, official statistics, academic publications, and credible reports from international organizations. By comparing and cross-referencing multiple sources, we reduced reliance on any single dataset and increased the accuracy of findings. In our attempt to ensure credibility, we have attempted to provide a source for our claims and provide an analysis of our findings based on available evidence.
In addition to our own desk-based research, we collaborated with law firms, non-governmental organizations, and independent practitioners who contributed pro bono support. These experts shared primary inputs into laws, relevant case studies, provided legal interpretations, reviewed our drafts and provided inputs from their field experience. Their input helped us strengthen the depth and reliability of each factsheet.
Structure
Each factsheet is divided into four sections:
- Legal Identity
- Overview
- Laws
- Designed to Include? The Impact of Digital ID and Legal Identity on Citizenship and Nationality Rights
Legal Identity
The primary focus on this section relates to assessing if a given country has a legal identity and who it is accessible to. It also explores the question of whether it forms a foundational document to access nationality. The definitions for proof of legal identity and civil registration that are used throughout the third edition follow the Guide drafted under the World Bank’s Identification for Development (ID4D) Initiative.[19]
Overview
This section provides an overview of digital identification (digital ID) systems in each country within the Asia Pacific, with a focus on their structure, scope, and implications. Our primary conceptual reference for referring to a digital ID system is drawn from the World Bank’s Glossary on Digital Identification. It further assesses whether each country’s digital ID is classified as foundational or functional, following the distinctions made in the World Bank’s ID4D Guide. Foundational IDs are “primarily created to manage identity information for the general population and provide credentials that serve as proof of identity for a wide variety of public and private sector transactions and services”,[20] while functional IDs are designed “to manage identification, authentication, and authorization for a particular service or transaction, such as voting, tax administration, social programs and transfers, financial services, and more”.[21] The analysis also considers whether the use of digital ID is legally or de facto mandatory or optional, whether it is available exclusively to citizens or also to non-citizens, and the range of services that are linked to it. Crucially, the section examines the availability of alternative pathways to access these services in cases where an individual does not hold or cannot obtain a digital ID. Beyond the ID systems themselves, the section explores the development of other forms of state-sponsored digital public infrastructure (DPI) and evaluates whether access to these platforms requires a digital ID. These lines of inquiry are critical in understanding patterns of inclusion and exclusion. They provide the analytical groundwork for mapping the ways in which digital ID systems intersect with questions of citizenship and the equitable delivery of essential services.
In addition, the section examines procedural safeguards in the design and rollout of digital ID systems. It investigates whether governments engaged in public consultations, solicited expert input, or conducted impact assessments before implementation, or whether the systems emerged primarily through Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) without significant public debate. This exploration helps to assess the extent to which the creation of digital ID systems reflects democratic processes and participatory governance. Understanding these procedural dimensions is essential for evaluating both the legitimacy of such systems and their potential social consequences.
Laws
This section examines the legal safeguards that govern digital identification (digital ID) systems, beginning with an assessment of the laws that apply to such systems in each country. This is a critical starting point, as many governments in the region have moved forward with implementing digital ID systems in the absence of a robust legal framework. Without legal safeguards, individuals’ most sensitive personal data is at risk. Digital ID systems typically collect highly private information, including biometric identifiers such as fingerprints and iris scans, as well as demographic details such as address, age, and gender.[22] The absence of strong regulatory protections exposes this data to potential misuse, surveillance, and security breaches, as has been widely reported.[23] Accordingly, this section not only reviews laws and policies directly governing digital IDs but also assesses the presence and the use of related legislation on data protection, privacy, surveillance, cybersecurity, and access to legal remedies in cases of rights violations.
The analysis further considers whether a country has drawn on another nation’s model in designing its own framework. It also examines how the country defines “digital ID” in its legal and policy documents. This is significant because no universally agreed definition of digital ID exists, and countries interpret and apply the concept differently. Moreover, States in the Asia Pacific are at varying stages of development and implementation of their systems. The scope of application is another critical point, wherein most cases, the legal definition specifies that digital IDs are accessible to citizens only, as observed in Afghanistan,[24] Nepal,[25] Fiji.[26] Such a scope automatically excludes stateless persons and other non-citizens from obtaining a digital ID, creating structural barriers to their access to essential services.
In addition to domestic law, the section explores a country’s international obligations. While there are no binding international treaties specifically addressing digital ID systems, States in the region are party to a range of core human rights instruments. The analysis considers whether the design and implementation of digital ID systems are consistent with obligations under treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the two Statelessness Conventions. The section evaluates whether digital ID and legal identity systems risk enabling discrimination in providing legal identity documents or access to digital ID, infringing the right to privacy, or denying individuals access to essential services, among others, which could amount to violations of these international commitments.
Designed to Include? Impact of Digital ID and Legal Identity on Citizenship and Nationality Rights
The final component of each country’s factsheet is an analytical section that synthesizes the findings from the preceding three sections to assess the implications of digital ID and legal identity systems for stateless individuals, drawing together evidence on legal frameworks, system design, and procedural safeguards. This section aims to identify patterns of exclusion that emerge directly or indirectly from the structure and requirements of digital ID systems. It examines how these systems may create or exacerbate barriers for stateless individuals in accessing essential services, exercising their rights, or participating fully in public life. Beyond identifying exclusionary outcomes, it also explores whether a digital ID system of a country reflects principles of inclusion, transparency, accountability, and human rights–based approaches. [27]
Where available, the section incorporates relevant judicial precedents that address digital ID systems in each country, providing insight into how national courts have interpreted and applied laws relating to identity, privacy, and access to services. These cases can reveal whether the judiciary has acted as a check on government overreach, upheld individual rights, or reinforced exclusionary policies. The section also evaluates whether governments have introduced targeted measures to facilitate access to digital IDs for vulnerable and marginalised groups, including stateless persons, persons with disabilities, minorities, and older persons. Examples of such measures might include deploying mobile registration units to remote areas, waiving documentation requirements in certain cases, offering free legal aid, or conducting outreach campaigns in multiple languages. This concluding analytical section aims to provide a holistic understanding of how digital ID systems intersect with the lived realities of stateless individuals and other at-risk populations.
Limitations
While our methodology maintained a high degree of consistency and credibility, it also faced certain constraints that shaped the scope and depth of our findings. We relied primarily on secondary data, which may not fully capture recent developments, unreported cases, or nuanced local realities. Future research on the subject should aim to incorporate primary fieldwork such that it leads to greater insight into the real on-the-ground impacts of digital ID systems, particularly on stateless individuals. The availability and quality of information varied considerably across countries. In some contexts, official statistics were outdated or inaccessible. Accessing laws and policies was particularly challenging in politically sensitive environments or where official documents were not available in English. In these cases, our reliance on official translations sometimes meant working with sources that reflected bias or omitted key details. Furthermore, many countries, particularly in the Pacific, were in the developmental stages of their digital ID systems,[28] which provided very limited room to understand its impact on stateless individuals. There were a few countries in the region which we could not find reviewers or collaborators for, resulting in not all country-specific data being verified directly by in-country stakeholders. The project also experienced temporary delays due to uncertainty arising from potential foreign aid cuts, which impacted timelines and workflow.
The findings presented in this report should be interpreted with these limitations in mind. The aim of this report is knowledge production. It is not intended to serve as legal advice. Future iterations of this research would benefit from incorporating primary field studies, strengthening collaborations with regional partners, and expanding the thematic scope to include other areas where stateless individuals may be affected by the introduction of digital ID systems.
