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Myanmar

Last updated : December 31, 2025

Digital ID Overview

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In 2016, the Myanmar government first conducted a pilot to replace Citizenship Scrutiny Cards/National Registration Cards with smart digital IDs.[31] In 2020, the Ministry for Labour, Immigration and Population announced the implementation of the e-ID system with the collection of biometric data and assigned a unique identity to individuals.[32] The plan was reintroduced in May 2024, when Myanmar’s National Unity Government announced the continuation of the 10-digit Unique Identification (UID) Smart Card.[33] This digital identity system is designed to serve as a centralized biometric identity platform, storing personal and biometric data (including fingerprints and facial recognition) on an embedded chip.[34]

The UID Smart Card is issued by the Ministry of Immigration and Population and is free of charge, according to official statements.[35] However, widespread reports indicate months-long delays in issuance and demands for bribes for expedited processing.[36] The UID is intended to be used across multiple sectors.[37] It is mandatory for accessing certain services, including border crossings, SIM card registration, banking and financial services, government benefits and pensions.[38] It is intended to be a foundational ID that digitally verifies the identity of an individual.[39] Reports suggest that the growing number of services requiring a UID is effectively turning it into a functional ID.[40]

As per information available, the UID is available to verified citizens, permanent residents and permanent taxpaying foreigners.[41] It is not mandated by a specific law, however, increasingly reports indicate it is required to access travel, immigration and other essential services.[42] Information available does not specify whether the UID is available to refugees and stateless persons. There is also no verifiable source available regarding whether holders of documents such as the TRC or NVC are eligible for the UID.

Law

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Domestic law and policy

Myanmar presently does not have a comprehensive legal framework that governs digital identity systems.[43] From 2013 onwards, government strategies (e-Governance Master Plan 2016–2020, and the 12-point Economic Policy) identified digital ID and ‘smart cards’ as priorities.[44] More recently, the Myanmar e-Governance Master Plan 2030, released in December 2024, outlines the country’s transition plan to a digital government.[45] This plan, however, does not provide a detailed outline of the digital identity system.[46]

Data Protection

As mentioned above, there is no specific law or comprehensive digital ID statute in force in Myanmar and ‘digital identity’ is not specifically defined.[47] Article 357 of the 2008 Constitution protects the ‘privacy and security of home, property, correspondence and other communications of citizens’.[48] Additionally, the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017) regulates searches, surveillance and interception, but does not create a general data protection regime or detailed rules for digital ID databases.[49] Myanmar’s digital ID system raises serious concerns in relation to privacy, surveillance, and access to public resources.[50] The UID Smart Card and biometric SIM card registration are used to track individuals’ movements and communications. However, they operate without a legal framework, and there is no independent system to ensure accountability or provide redress..[51]

While certain provisions related to privacy exist in laws such as the Electronic Transactions Law (2004, amended in 2021)Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (2017)  and Cybersecurity Law (2025), none of these laws provide a comprehensive or enforceable structure for safeguarding personal data, particularly in the context of the country’s expanding digital identity system.[52] Furthermore, there is limited information available regarding the legal requirement for encryption of UID data. There are also no restrictions on government access to this information. The DLA Piper Data Protection Laws of the World report confirms that Myanmar relies on fragmented sectoral provisions and that there is no general data protection law in Myanmar nor an independent supervisory body to oversee data processing by public authorities or private actors.[53]

Additionally, in June 2021, Human Rights Watch reported that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) shared the personal and biometric data of Rohingya refugees with the Bangladesh government.[54] This information was later made accessible to Myanmar authorities, and the transfer occurred without obtaining the refugees’ informed consent.[55] Human Rights Watch warned that this data could be used by Myanmar authorities to facilitate forced or unsafe repatriation, surveillance, or discrimination against a population that remains stateless and persecuted.[56] 

International Commitments

Myanmar is not a party to international data protection frameworks such as the GDPR. Myanmar is a party to the CRC, and the CRPD.[57] The implementation of the UID system may violate the country’s human rights obligations with respect to access to essential services such as healthcare, education, and employment.[58] Most notably, the fulfilment of the country’s obligations under the CRC (Articles 7 and 24), and CRPD (Article 5, 24, and 25).[59] Myanmar has not ratified the ICCPR, ICESR, or acceded to the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions or the Refugee Convention.[60]

In addition, as a member state, the ASEAN Framework on Personal Data Protection and Framework on Digital Data Governance sets out non-binding principles to promote coordination and raise standards around data protection, privacy, and secure digital economies.[61] It encourages member states to adopt national data protection laws and supports mutual recognition. However, it does not impose binding commitments or specific mandates on digital ID systems or make provisions for the protection of stateless persons.[62]

Lastly, the country has also pledged to the Ministerial Declaration on a Decade of Action for Inclusive and Resilient Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in Asia and the Pacific at The Third Ministerial Conference on Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in Asia and the Pacific (2025).[63] As per the declaration, countries have pledged to ensure that every birth is registered by 2030 and to close registration gaps among marginalized populations.[64] Moreover, the declaration notes the barriers faced by stateless persons in access to civil registration services and pledged to ‘develop and implement measures to avoid the potential exclusion of digitally marginalized or vulnerable populations from statistical data and facilitate their access to services and entitlements’.[65]

Designed to Include?

The Impact of Digital ID and Legal Identity on Citizenship and Nationality Rights

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Available information does not indicated that the introduction of the Unique Identification (UID) Smart Card has contributed to reducing statelessness. It is possible that it has reinforced and institutionalized the exclusion of stateless populations from legal identity and access to essential services.[66]

For stateless persons, like the Rohingya community in particular, the UID system continues the administrative exclusion they have faced. Digital identity initiatives have not altered the legal and policy foundation in the country. United Nations bodies and independent fact-finding missions have repeatedly identified the denial of citizenship and identity documentation as a core element of the persecution of the Rohingya.[67] The denial or revocation of digital ID in Myanmar does not directly cause statelessness in a legal sense, but it functions as a mechanism of exclusion that entrenches statelessness. Without access to the UID, stateless individuals are unable to access a wide range of state-sponsored services, including – healthcare, education, formal employment, travel permits, banking and financial services, SIM card registration and public benefits and pensions.[68]

While the government promotes the NVC as a pathway to citizenship, in practice, it has failed to guarantee any citizenship rights.[69] Those who are documented are often required by the government to obtain an NVC as a prerequisite for further scrutiny, even when they may qualify for a Citizenship Scrutiny Card.[70] For Rohingya particularly, UN agencies, international NGOs, and Rohingya civil society groups have documented that possession of an NVC has not resulted in citizenship, security of status, or protection from abuse, but has instead functioned as a tool of population control and data extraction.[71]

As of 2025, there is no public evidence that the government has undertaken special measures to ensure access to digital ID for vulnerable or isolated communities, such as stateless persons, persons with disabilities, or the elderly. There is no available information about mobile registration units, legal aid programs, or policy provisions aimed at facilitating inclusive access and the system as a whole remains centralized, opaque, and exclusionary.[72] This absence of safeguards has particular consequences for the Rohingya, many of whom lack freedom of movement, face language and literacy barriers, and reside in camps or segregated villages under heavy surveillance.[73] No credible evidence indicates that Rohingya holding Temporary Registration Cards (TRCs), Temporary Approval Cards, or NVCs are eligible for UID enrolment, nor that UID issuance could override their exclusion from citizenship.

Additionally, since the 2021 coup, human rights reports indicate that the National Unity Government has used digital technologies to carry out mass surveillance, identify dissent and target opposition movements.[74] The violation of right to privacy also exacerbates discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, women, LGBTIQ+ communities, persons with disabilities, older persons, and other marginalised groups.[75] Therefore, the digital ID infrastructure can potentially be used to further target individuals, including stateless persons.

To improve the system, Myanmar would need to enact a comprehensive data protection law aligned with international human rights standards. The state should establish independent oversight mechanisms for digital ID governance and ensure non-discriminatory access to digital ID, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or citizenship status.[76] In addition, introduce legal pathways for stateless individuals to obtain identity documentation and access services.[77] Furthermore, implement safeguards against surveillance and misuse, such as judicial oversight of data access and prohibitions on profiling individuals.[78] Lastly, the government should provide accessible grievance mechanisms for individuals denied ID or services, including appeals processes and legal aid.[79]

1.^

 Child Rights Law 2019 s 21.

2.^

 Ward and Village Administration Law 2012 ss 13, 19.

3.^

 ‘Legal Assistance’ (UNHCR Myanmar) <https://help.unhcr.org/myanmar/legal-assistance/> accessed 13 November 2025; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘DFAT Country Information Report Myanmar’ (2025) 45 <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/country-information-report-myanmar.pdf>.

4.^

 Inclusive Citizenship and Human Rights, ‘Citizenship and National Identity – Case:Myanmar’ <https://www.inclusive-citizenship.no/citizenship-and-national-identity/case-myanmar/> accessed 18 December 2025.

5.^

 Elizabeth Rhoads and others, ‘Modalities of Bureaucratic Violence: Bordering via Civil Documentation in Myanmar’ (2025) 0 Journal of Borderlands Studies 1; ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (Amnesty International, 21 November 2017) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/7484/2017/en/> accessed 13 November 2025; ‘Two-Child Policy Violates Human Rights of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims – UN Expert | UN News’ (31 May 2013) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/05/441112> accessed 18 December 2025.

6.^

 Rhoads and others (n 5); ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5); ‘Two-Child Policy Violates Human Rights of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims – UN Expert | UN News’ (n 5).

7.^

 Rhoads and others (n 5); ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5); ‘Two-Child Policy Violates Human Rights of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims – UN Expert | UN News’ (n 5).

8.^

 Rhoads and others (n 5); ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5); ‘Two-Child Policy Violates Human Rights of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims – UN Expert | UN News’ (n 5).

9.^

 Ward and Village Administration Law s 13.

10.^

 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 46.

11.^

ibid

12.^

 ‘Legal Assistance’ (n 3); Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3).

13.^

 Rhoads and others (n 5); European Network on Statelessness and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘Statelessness in Myanmar - Country Position Paper’ (2019) <https://statelessjourneys.org/wp-content/uploads/StatelessJourneys-Myanmar-final.pdf>.

15.^

 Burma Citizenship Law 1982.

16.^

 ibid II; Online Burma/Myanmar Library, ‘List of Ethnic Groups in Burma’ <https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/docs21/Ethnicity_Codes.pdf>; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 45; Human Rights Watch, ‘Burma/Bangladesh: Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh - Discrimination in Arakan’ <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm> accessed 13 November 2025; ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5) 29.

17.^

 Human Rights Watch (n 16); Burma Citizenship Law ch III.

18.^

 Burma Citizenship Law ch IV.

19.^

 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 44.

20.^

 Ministry of Immigration and Population and UNHCR, ‘Basic Facts about Applying Citizenship Scrutiny Card (Unoffical Translation)’ <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/50107.>.

21.^

ibid

22.^

 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 45; ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5) 29.

23.^

 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 45; ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5) 29; UK Home Office, ‘Country Policy and Information Note: Rohingya Including Rohingya in Bangladesh, Burma, June 2023’ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/burma-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-rohingya-including-rohingya-in-bangladesh-burma-june-2023-accessible> accessed 18 December 2025.

24.^

 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 45; ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5) 29.

25.^

 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 45; ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5) 29.

26.^

 ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5).

27.^

 UK Home Office (n 23).

28.^

 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 45,46; ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5) 29.

29.^

 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, ‘Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine - Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State’ (2017) 27 <https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Advisory-Commission-on-Rakhine-State-Report.pdf>.

30.^

 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 45,46; ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5) 29.

31.^

 Wai Wai Lwin, ‘Govt Pilot Project Introduces Digital ID Cards’ (The Irrawaddy, 15 December 2016) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/govt-pilot-project-introduces-digital-id-cards.html> accessed 14 November 2025.

32.^

 ‘E-IDs Fundamental to e-Governance: U Thein Swe | Ministry Of Information’ <https://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/news/362> accessed 20 November 2025.

33.^

 Karen News, ‘Junta Adopts UID Smart Card System for Thailand-Myanmar Cross-Border Passes Myawaddy Myanmar- Thai Border’ (Karen News, 3 May 2024) <https://karennews.org/2024/05/junta-adopts-uid-smart-card-system-for-thailand-myanmar-cross-border-passes-myawaddy-myanmar-thai-border/> accessed 14 November 2025; RFA Burmese, ‘Myanmar Now Requires Biometric “Smart Card” to Exit Country by Border’ (Radio Free Asia, 20 May 2024) <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/smart-card-border-pass-05202024164811.html> accessed 14 November 2025; ‘Thingangyun Township Begins Issuing Smart Cards to Residents’ (MDN - Myanmar DigitalNews) <http://www.mdn.gov.mm/en/thingangyun-township-begins-issuing-smart-cards-residents> accessed 14 November 2025.

34.^

 Burmese (n 33); Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 46.

35.^

 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3) 46; ‘Undertones: Myanmar’s E-ID System Means Progress or Surveillance?’ (Global Voices, 12 March 2024) <https://globalvoices.org/2024/03/12/myanmars-e-id-system-progress-or-surveillance/> accessed 18 November 2025.

36.^

 CNI, ‘Price of UID Smart Card Token Is around 100,000 Kyats’ (cnimyanmar.com) <https://cnimyanmar.com/index.php/english-edition/22033-price-of-uid-smart-card-token-is-around-100-000-kyats> accessed 20 November 2025; Mizzima, ‘Yangon Residents Being Charged for Free Smart ID Cards’ (14 June 2024) <https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/06/14/10814> accessed 20 November 2025.

37.^

 ‘UID Essential for People - Global New Light Of Myanmar’ (29 August 2023) <https://www.gnlm.com.mm/uid-essential-for-people/> accessed 18 November 2025.

38.^

ibid

39.^

 ‘ကန်ကြီးထောင့်မြို့နယ်တွင် UID နံပါတ်များ ထုတ်ပေးနိုင်ရေးဆောင်ရွက်မှုလုပ်ငန်း အဆင့်ဆင့်အား သွားရောက်တွေ့ဆုံမေးမြန်း | Information and Public Relations Department’ <https://www.moi.gov.mm/iprd/news/162025> accessed 18 December 2025. [unofficial translation with Google Translate]

40.^

 Mizzima, ‘Myanmar Citizens without UID Numbers Not Allowed Abroad’ (2024) <https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/05/04/9549> accessed 18 December 2025; Human Rights for Digital Identity, ‘Myanmar’ <https://hr4id.org/myanmar/> accessed 21 November 2025.

41.^

 ‘UID Essential for People - Global New Light Of Myanmar’ (n 37).

42.^

 Human Rights for Digital Identity (n 40).

43.^
 Myanmar Computer Federation, ‘Digital Strategies in Myanmar’ (2023) 9, 10 <https://cicc.or.jp/english/wp-content/uploads/231213Myanmar.pdf>.
44.^
 Human Rights for Digital Identity (n 40).
46.^
ibid
47.^
 Human Rights for Digital Identity (n 40).
48.^
 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008.
49.^
 Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens 2017.
50.^
 Human Rights Myanmar, ‘Privacy Violations and Discrimination in Myanmar’ (8 June 2025) <https://humanrightsmyanmar.org/privacy-violations-and-discrimination-in-myanmar/> accessed 21 November 2025.
51.^
 ibid; Privacy International, ‘Submission to the Human Rights Council at the 37th Session of the Universal Periodic Review’ (2021) <https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/PI%20Summary%20Myanmar%20UPR%2027.11.20.pdf>.
52.^
 Human Rights for Digital Identity (n 40); Human Rights Myanmar (n 50).
53.^
 DLA Piper, ‘Data Protection Laws in Myanmar - Data Protection Laws of the World’ (18 December 2024) <https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/?t=law&c=MM#insight> accessed 18 December 2025.
54.^
 ‘UN Shared Rohingya Data Without Informed Consent | Human Rights Watch’ (15 June 2021) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/15/un-shared-rohingya-data-without-informed-consent> accessed 18 December 2025.
55.^
ibid
56.^
ibid
57.^
 OHCHR, ‘UN Treaty Body Database’ <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=20&Lang=EN> accessed 20 November 2025.
58.^
 Burmese (n 33); ‘UID Essential for People - Global New Light Of Myanmar’ (n 37).
59.^
 ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (OHCHR) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child> accessed 17 October 2025; ‘Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (OHCHR) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities> accessed 20 November 2025.
60.^
 OHCHR (n 57).
61.^
 ASEAN TELMIN, ‘Framework on Personal Data Protection’ (2016) <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2016-Frmwk-PDP.pdf>; ASEAN TELMIN, ‘Framework on Digital Data Governance’ (2018) <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/2018-Framework-Digital-Data-Governance.pdf>.
62.^
 ASEAN TELMIN, ‘Framework on Personal Data Protection’ (n 61); ASEAN TELMIN, ‘Framework on Digital Data Governance’ (n 61).
63.^
 UNESCAP, ‘Ministerial Declaration on a Decade of Action for Inclusive and Resilient Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in Asia and the Pacific’ (2025) ESCAP/MCCRVS/2-25/6/Add.1 <https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/event-documents/2500197E_ESCAP_MCCRVS_2025_6_Add1_Ministerial_Declaration.pdf?_gl=1*vdnplp*_ga*NTMxNDc5Mjc4LjE3NjIzMjk2NDg.*_ga_SB1ZX36Y86*czE3NjIzMjk2NDckbzEkZzEkdDE3NjIzMzA1MDgkajI3JGwwJGgw>; UNESCAP, ‘Report on the Third Ministerial Conference on Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in Asia Pacific’ (2025) ESCAP/MCCRVS/2025/6 <https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/event-documents/2500210E_ESCAP_MCCRVS_2025_6_Report_3rd_Ministerial_Conference_on_CRVS.pdf?_gl=1*1bh2iwy*_ga*NTMxNDc5Mjc4LjE3NjIzMjk2NDg.*_ga_SB1ZX36Y86*czE3NjI0NTA3NzUkbzIkZzEkdDE3NjI0NTE1NDMkajEkbDAkaDA.>.
64.^
 ‘Asia-Pacific Nations Reaffirm Commitment to Legal Identity for All at Third Ministerial Conference on Civil Registration and Vital Statistics | Get Every One in the Picture’ <https://crvs.unescap.org/news/asia-pacific-nations-reaffirm-commitment-legal-identity-all-third-ministerial-conference-civil> accessed 7 November 2025.
65.^
 UNESCAP (n 63).
66.^

Amanda R Cheong, ‘Racial Exclusion by Bureaucratic Omission: Non-Enumeration, Documentary Dispossession, and the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar’ (2025) 72 Social Problems 341, 341.

67.^

Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (n 29); ‘Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’ (OHCHR, 2 June 2019) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index> accessed 18 December 2025.

68.^

‘UID Essential for People - Global New Light Of Myanmar’ (n 37).

69.^

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n 3); ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5); Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (n 29).

70.^

‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5); Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (n 29); Burma Human Rights Network, ‘National Verification Cards - A Barrier to Rohingya Repatriation’ (2019) <https://www.bhrn.org.uk/en/report/1090-national-verification-cards-a-barrier-to-rohingya-repatriation-full-report.html> accessed 21 November 2025.

71.^

‘Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’ (n 67); Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (n 29); ‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5).

72.^

Centre for Law and Democracy, ‘Myanmar: Analysis of Digital IDs and Human Rights’ (2020) <https://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/20.12.10.Myanmar-Digital-ID-Note.PR_.pdf> accessed 21 November 2025.

73.^

‘Myanmar: “Caged without a Roof”: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’ (n 5).

74.^

‘The Myanmar Junta’s Partners in Digital Surveillance and Censorship | Justice For Myanmar’ <https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/the-myanmar-juntas-partners-in-digital-surveillance-and-censorship> accessed 18 December 2025; Human Rights Myanmar (n 50).

75.^

Human Rights Myanmar (n 50).

76.^

Centre for Law and Democracy (n 72) 19, 20.

77.^

Centre for Law and Democracy (n 72).

78.^

ibid.

79.^

ibid.