Overview

Law

1. Citizenship Law

a. Jus Sanguinis and/or Jus Soli Provisions

The citizenship laws of most States in Southeast Asia operate through a solely jus sanguinis structure, with Viet Nam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia’s legislation operating through a combined jus sanguinis and jus soli structure. While operating through a jus sanguinis structure, jus soli factors also come into play in Brunei due to the distinction between children born inside or outside of the country. In Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Timor-Leste, children born to a citizen parent will gain citizenship regardless of birthplace. Laos and Singapore have jus sanguinis structures that differentiate between persons born within or outside of the country. Cambodia’s jus soli provision provides that children born in the country to parents who are both foreigners and were both born and living legally in Cambodia gain Khmer citizenship by birth. Further, children born in Thailand automatically acquire Thai citizenship under jus soli provisions unless they are born to alien parents, one of whom is a temporary resident, residing in Thailand illegally, or a diplomat. In Malaysia, abandoned children and foundlings will gain citizenship by “operation of the law”, meaning that the citizenship acquisition is automatic. Viet Nam’s jus soli provisions provide citizenship by birth to children born to one citizen parent and one foreigner where the two parents cannot reach an agreement on the citizenship for the child upon birth registration, children born to two stateless parents with permanent residence, children born to a stateless mother with permanent residence where the father is unknown, and foundling children. In Indonesia, children born to parents with an unclear citizenship status, newborn children found in Indonesia with unknown parents, and children born in Indonesia when both parents lack citizenship or their existence is unknown can also obtain citizenship by birth.

Of particular note, the citizenship law of Malaysia contains gender discriminatory provisions barring women from transferring their nationality onto their children if they are born outside of the territory of Malaysia. The citizenship law of Singapore also contains gender discriminatory provisions which limit the ability of mothers to confer citizenship onto children born in the State whose fathers are diplomats or members of foreign forces during times of war. The laws of five States (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines (for naturalized women only), Thailand and Singapore) contain gender discriminatory provisions that limit the ability of married women to confer their nationality onto foreign spouses on the same basis as men.

The interrelation between ethnicity and citizenship is notable in Southeast Asia, specifically in Brunei, Cambodia and Myanmar. Two States (Myanmar and Brunei) have ethnically defined jus sanguinis structures. The citizenship laws of Brunei operate largely through jus sanguinis structure and contain both racial and gender discriminatory provisions. Brunei’s citizenship laws limit persons who can gain citizenship through the operation of law to persons of certain defined ethnic groups and whose father or both parents (but not mother alone) is a citizen of Brunei. Similarly, citizenship of Myanmar is defined largely upon ethnic ground, and through jus sanguinis principles, with citizenship available to those who are considered “nationals” or whose parents both are nationals and members of defined ethnic groups. Further the citizenship legislation of Myanmar is the only legislation in the Asia-Pacific that explicitly provides for two other categories of citizenship being associate citizenship and naturalised citizenship, which the government may confer on any person ‘in the interest of the State’.

Eight States out of eleven States in Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Loas, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore) do not provide an explicit definition of a stateless person or statelessness in their citizenship legislation. Timor-Leste’s citizenship law does include a definition of a stateless person; however, it is not in line with the definition provided by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Only two States, the Philippines and Viet Nam, provide a definition of a stateless person which aligns with the definition provided by the 1954 Convention. The 1954 Convention defines a stateless person as someone “who is not considered as a national by any State under operation of its law”, which does not place the burden of proof on the stateless person.

b. Naturalized Citizenship

While there is no simplified or expedited procedure available to stateless persons in 7 countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste), they may be eligible to apply for the standard naturalization procedure. In Brunei, stateless persons may also be eligible for the standard naturalization process. However, reports of extremely long waits to hear of decisions on citizenship (5-10 years) as well as the long required residency period (20-25 years) presents a barrier to accessing citizenship through this process. In Myanmar, stateless persons are not eligible for any naturalization process as the process is reserved only for people with a citizen parent or who have married a citizen. In Viet Nam, there is a simplified procedure of naturalization available to stateless persons who had resided in the country for at least 20 years by 2009, which waives the requirement of all identity documents for those who do not have such documentation. The Philippines provides both a simplified and expedited procedure of naturalization for stateless persons and refugees, the Rule on Facilitated Naturalization of Refugees and Stateless Persons which is the first of its kind in the world. According to Article 32 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, naturalization should be expedited for stateless persons to “reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings”.

c. Dual Citizenship

Cambodia and Timor-Leste are the only States in Southeast Asia which allow dual citizenship. While 5 States (Burnei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore) prohibit dual citizenship, Laos, Philippines, and Viet Nam permit it only in certain cases. Dual citizenship is generally recognized for those with jus soli citizenship in Thailand, although the law tends to be inconsistently implemented. Brunei’s legislation contains some gender discrimination in this context, as women who acquire foreign citizenship through marriage will cease to be Brunei citizens. However, the same provision does not exist with regards to Bruneian men. Foreigners applying for naturalization in Laos may have to endure an indefinite period of temporary statelessness due to the requirement to renounce prior citizenship prior to application. The renunciation process is not stipulated by legislation in Malaysia or the Philippines. The renunciation processes of all States other than Laos in Southeast Asia, where relevant, do not place persons at risk of statelessness. Article 7(1)(a) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness states that State parties which allow renunciation of citizenship must ensure that “such renunciation shall not result in loss of nationality unless the person concerned possesses or acquires another nationality”.

2. Treaty Ratification Status

There is varied ratification of treaties across Southeast Asia, with some States — including Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam — having very high rates of ratification, while others — Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore — very low. Three States (Cambodia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste) are parties to the Refugee Convention and its Protocol.

All States are parties to CEDAW and CRC. Brunei and Malaysia notably maintain reservation to Article 9(2) of CEDAW, which provides women with equal rights regarding the nationality of their children. Malaysia has also retained a reservation in respect to Article 7 of the CRC which provides the right to a nationality. This leaves Malaysia with minimal to no relevant international treaty-based obligations to protect or uphold a person’s right to nationality.

Eight of the eleven States in the sub-region are parties to ICESCR (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor- Leste, and Viet Nam) and seven States have acceded to ICCPR (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam). Six States (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam) are also all parties to ICERD.

The Philippines represents a model for progressive legislation towards the prevention of statelessness in the Southeast Asia subregion. Principally, the Philippines is the only State in Southeast Asia, which is party to either of the Stateless Conventions, having ratified both the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions. The country also defines a stateless person as “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law” in its Rule on Facilitated Naturalization of Refugees and Stateless Persons, which is directly aligned with the definition included in the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons. It is also the only country in the entire Asia-Pacific region to have implemented a statelessness determination procedure, which it established in 2012. The Philippines also notably introduced a National Action Plan to End Statelessness in 2015 based on UNHCR’s Global Action Plan to End Statelessness. Thailand and Viet Nam have also made notable strides towards ending statelessness in their territories. Over the past decade, the Thai government has worked in partnership with UNHCR and NGOs to both expand the rights of non-citizens and to identify and provide access to citizenship for those children entitled to it. Between October 2020 and September 2021, 2,740 stateless persons were granted citizenship. Because of the exemplary work of the Thai government in identifying stateless persons, the figures of statelessness in Thailand have increased in the last five years from 443,862 in 2015 to 574,219 in 2022. Vietnam too has made significant strides towards ending statelessness by amending laws that provide for a simplified naturalization process as well as an option to reacquire Vietnamese citizenship after renunciation.

Status of Accession of International Human Rights Treaties in Southeast Asia

Country	Stateless 1	Stateless 2	Refugee	ICCPR	ICESCR	ICERD	CRC	CEDAW
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
v
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Vietnam
Total	1	1	3	7	8	8	11	11

Signifies that the country is a party to the convention

Stateless 1 – 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons

Signifies that the country is not a party to the convention

Stateless 2 – 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

Population

1. Reported Stateless Persons

Based on statistics reported to UNHCR, Southeast Asia as a sub-region hosts the largest number of persons affected by statelessness, collectively reporting over 1.4 million stateless persons. All countries apart from Laos and Timor-Leste have reported figures on stateless persons in 2022 to UNHCR.

Most identified stateless populations within Southeast Asia consists of in situ ethnic minority groups who have experienced protracted and intergenerational statelessness. Myanmar has the largest reported stateless population, reporting 630,000 stateless persons to UNHCR in 2022. UNHCR notes that the figure of 630,000 persons represents the estimate of UNHCR of the number of stateless Rohingyas both in Rakhine state and those that are internally displaced.

Ethnic minority groups in Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam also face protracted and intergenerational statelessness. With the largest of these populations including 574,219 people in Thailand (largely comprised of members of the ‘Hill Tribe’ communities), 75,000 persons of Vietnamese ethnicity in Cambodia, a population of 26,811 people in Viet Nam (including members of the Hmong community and people of Cambodian heritage) and over 20,000 persons of Chinese heritage in Brunei. The entirety of this reported population in Indonesia consists of stateless Rohingya refugees. UNHCR also noted that there is a potentially large number of unreported non-displaced stateless persons in Indonesia which there is currently no reliable data on. Further, there is a lack of recent reliable statistics on the stateless population in Brunei, which has no available data on stateless persons without formalized residency.

Reported stateless population in Southeast Asia

Country	2019 (year start)	2020 (year end)	2021 (year end)	2022 (year end)
Brunei Darussalam	20,863	20,863	20,863	20,863
Cambodia	57,444	57,444	75,000	75,000
Indonesia	582	874	641	925
Lao People’s Democratic Republic	–	–	–	–
Malaysia	108,332	111,289	112,420	115,169
Myanmar	600,000	600,000	600,000	630,000
Philippines	383	387	260	267
Singapore	1,303	1,109	1,109	1,109
Thailand	475,009	480,695	561,527	574,219
Timor-Leste	–	–	–	–
Vietnam	30,581	32,890	35,475	26,811
TOTALS	1,294,497	1,305,551	1,407,295	1,444,363

Source: UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement from 2019-2022

2. Persons at Risk of Statelessness

Overall, higher rates of civil registration (compared to the Pacific) and less reliance on household registrations (compared to East Asia) should lead to a lower number of persons seen to be at risk of statelessness within Southeast Asia. However, there remains a number of identified groups who remain at risk. In Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and Thailand low rates of birth registration among certain populations have exposed potentially millions of children to the risk of statelessness, with children of migrant workers and ethnic minorities left especially vulnerable to statelessness. Within the Philippines six population groups have been identified as being at risk of statelessness: indigenous sea-faring Sama Bajau, persons of Indonesian descent (the status of most of this population group has been resolved in recent years), foundlings, unregistered children who have been forcibly displaced due to armed conflict and persons of Japanese descent (even though most cases have now been resolved or are in the process of getting resolved). Within Malaysia multiple populations have also been identified including persons who have resided in Malaysia since pre-independence as well as their descendants (including individuals of Tamil ethnicity), children of mixed-nationality marriages (through the impact of gender discriminatory nationality laws), indigenous persons (including mobile maritime populations and Orang Asli communities), refugees and irregular migrants (and their children) in Sabah East Malaysia, as well as persons lacking documentation and foundling children.

Indonesians of Chinese Origin (due to different historical circumstances and legal complications); some Indonesians of Chinese origin; Indonesians of Indian Origin (due historical and legal reasons); Indonesian migrant workers (who confront documentation challenges or have their citizenship status questioned); exiled Indonesians (who were forced to leave Indonesia for political or other reasons face difficulties re-establishing their citizenship upon their return); and undocumented Chinese Migrants are all populations affected by statelessness in Indonesia. In Brunei, children born to a Brunei citizen mother, indigenous populations including Dusun and Iban populations , and foreign wives of citizens as at risk of statelessness.

3. Pledges to End Statelessness

At the 2023 Global Refugee Forum (GRF), the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines pledged its commitment to the “protection of stateless persons and persons at risk of statelessness in Sabah, through inter-[National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) Memoranda of Understanding (MoU)] on Statelessness”. The inter-NHRI MoU on Statelessness seeks to improve “policy and operational frameworks to ensure protection of the rights of stateless persons and persons at risk of statelessness in Sabah through cooperation between the National Human Rights Institutions of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines”. It is also intended to enhance coordination and cooperation between the “Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines, as an independent NHRI, and the Government of the Philippines in addressing issues of statelessness in Sabah with a human rights-based approach”.

Thailand also pledged to “resolve statelessness, with priority being given to children born in Thailand” as part of the 2023 GRF. The government set out its objectives for resolving statelessness as:

1. “Developing, within two years, a national action plan on the reduction of statelessness and the management of forcibly displaced persons in Thailand, with priority given to stateless children, and through collaboration between government agencies, private sector, and civil society”;

2. “Enhancing effectiveness of the systems to facilitate access by stateless persons to civil registration services, with a view to expediting the process for children born in Thailand and the elderly”;

3. “Reviewing existing laws and regulations related to nationality, civil registration and immigration, in order to facilitate access to legal residence, nationality and civic rights, particularly for children born in Thailand; as well as”

4. “Cooperating with UNHCR and joining the Global Alliance to End Statelessness”.

At the High-Level Segment on Stateless in October 2019, both the Philippines and Indonesia made pledges related to the prevention of statelessness. The Philippines committed:

To enhance the policy, legal, and operational framework for stateless persons to ensure their full access to rights as guaranteed by the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons including their facilitated naturalization and as may be provided by national laws;
To improve access of vulnerable and marginalized populations to documentation through birth and civil registration;
To continue the study of statelessness, with a thrust to improve qualitative and quantitative data on populations at risk of statelessness in the Philippines and among its nationals, in continuation of efforts initiated in 2011;
To continue the process of accession to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;
To continue leadership in Southeast Asia in the development of a human rights framework and provide technical support to other States in dealing with issues relating to stateless persons; and
To cooperate with UNHCR by supporting projects, continuing fund contributions, and by building or expanding partnerships.

So far, the Philippines has been successful in ratifying the 1961 Convention on statelessness. Indonesia also pledged to:

increase the scope of operation and the provision of infrastructure related to its national citizenship registry;
increase the utilisation of a digital platform for citizenship registry and citizenship documentations such as the issuance of birth certificate and single identity number;
enhance cooperation with UNHCR in handling refugees and asylum seekers , and
to work with all countries, particularly the two Statelessness Conventions, to learn together, increase capacities, and exchange technology in addressing statelessness.

On this, significant advancements towards these goals are yet to be seen from Indonesia.

Source: Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2022

4. Stateless Refugee

Four countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) in the region reported populations of stateless refugees to UNHCR in 2022. All of the reported stateless refugees are Rohingya from Myanmar, with Malaysia reporting the largest population (103,380), while Indonesia (925), the Philippines (11) and Thailand (321) all reported comparatively small population groups. In total, the sub-region has reported 104,637 stateless Rohingya refugees.

5. Undetermined Nationalities

In March 2022 the Chief Minister of Sabah, Malaysia announced that 810,443 residents of Sabah are non-citizens. This group represents the largest and most notable population of undetermined nationality within Southeast Asia as disagreement exists as to whether this population are stateless or should be considered citizens of either the Philippines, Malaysia or Indonesia. The citizenship status of other population groups including children of returned marriage migrants in Viet Nam and persons of Chinese, Indian and Nepali descent in Myanmar remains uncertain.

Causes of Statelessness

1. Discriminatory nationality laws

As noted above, ethnicity and national identity share a deep connection within a number of States in Southeast Asia. The most conspicuous example of this is the ethnic discrimination present in the nationality law of Myanmar that has rendered hundreds of thousands of ethnic Rohingya stateless. Denial of citizenship to the Rohingya, as codified in the 1982 citizenship law, has been a key component of the systemic oppression and persecution of the Rohingya people by the government and military of Myanmar prior to the 2021 military coup.

Additionally, ethnic discrimination affects a number of other populations in countries other than Myanmar. For example, in the process of Thai nation building in the 20th Century, Thai ethnicity and citizenship were deeply entwined. Members of nine ethnic groups often referred to as ‘hill-tribe’ or ‘highland’ communities living in the northwest of the country have faced intergenerational statelessness due to social exclusion. In Brunei, limitations of nationality to certain prescribed ethnic groups, or “indigenous groups of the Malay race” is the primary cause of statelessness with the largest stateless registered stateless group being persons of Chinese heritage.

Gender discriminatory nationality laws place a number of children at risk of statelessness in Malaysia and Brunei. Notably, children born outside of Malaysia to Malaysian citizen mothers and foreign fathers do not immediately gain citizenship of Malaysia. Children born in Malaysia out of wedlock (or in situations where the marriage is not recognised by the State, notably non-Islamic customary or religious marriages) to a Malaysian citizen father and a mother who is stateless or whose citizenship cannot be ascertained, are also at risk of statelessness due to discriminatory provision that disallow the transfer of nationality from a father outside of wedlock.

A combination of ethnic discrimination and gender discriminatory provisions also rendered stateless persons of Japanese descent who were born in the Philippines between the 1930’s and 1970’s (as well as their descendants) to Filipino mothers and Japanese fathers. Some gender discrimination remains in the citizenship legislation of the Philippines, as naturalized alien women who are married to Philippine citizen men may ipso facto become a Philippine citizen through marriage; however, Philippine citizen women cannot confer nationality to a foreign spouse on the same basis as men. Singapore’s citizenship law also contains some gender discriminatory provisions, where a child born in Singapore to a citizen mother and a father who is foreign diplomat will not be a citizen, despite the fact that the child should be eligible for citizenship by descent through their citizen mother. The limitation on the ability of married women to confer nationality to their foreign spouse on the same basis as men also constitutes gender discrimination. Singapore law’s retention of the concept of illegitimacy, as applied to children born out of wedlock, creates a discriminatory imbalance and an increased risk of statelessness for children deemed as “illegitimate”. While Thailand’s 2008 amendments to its citizenship law allowed for foreign spouses to apply for Thai citizenship without the requirement of permanent residence, the Act still does not allow for full gender equality in the ability to confer citizenship to foreign spouses. Women are also limited in their ability to confer nationality onto foreign husbands in Brunei while Brunei men are able to confer nationality to a foreign spouse.

2. Lack of Legal Safeguards Against Childhood Statelessness

Two States in Southeast Asia (Brunei and Myanmar) provide no protection for stateless or foundling children to gain citizenship. The citizenship laws of six States (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam) explicitly provide that foundling children will be considered citizens. In Indonesia, there have been some implementation issues due to the absence of specific guidelines and procedures of the provisions. The citizenship laws of three States (Malaysia, Thailand and Timor-Leste) provide some protection for foundling children under their law. Malaysian law considers those born in Malaysia who are not born citizens of another country to be citizens of Malaysia. Timor-Leste’s citizenship laws provide that a child of ‘incognito parents’ will be considered an original citizen of Timor-Leste. Foundlings can acquire Thai nationality through naturalization. However, there are many conditions of naturalization that limit many foundlings from accessing the naturalization process.

Brunei, Myanmar, the Philippines and Singapore do not provide any explicit protection for children born to stateless parents. The jus soli provisions of Cambodian citizenship law may provide protection to children born to stateless parents in limited circumstances (where those parents were born and resided legally in Cambodia and were considered ‘foreigners’). The citizenship laws of Indonesia, Laos, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam explicitly provide that children born to stateless parents will be considered citizens. In Viet Nam, the parents must have a ‘permanent residence’ in Viet Nam. Laotian citizenship similarly provides that children born to stateless parents are considered Laotian citizens if the parents are permanently residing in Laos and have ‘integrated to the Lao society and culture’. The Malaysian Constitution provides that every person born in Malaysia who is “not born a citizen of any country” will be considered as a citizen of Malaysia. Thailand’s jus soli citizenship provisions may provide avenues to citizenship to children of stateless parents who have regularized stay in Thailand. Article 1 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness states that State parties “shall grant nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless” either “by birth, by operation of law, or upon and application”.

3. Citizenship Stripping

Citizenship stripping is a less prevalent cause of statelessness within Southeast Asia. However, four countries (Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar, and Viet Nam) have notable instances of citizenship deprivation. Under the operation of the 1958 citizenship law, persons residing outside of Indonesia for a period of more than five years without registration lost their Indonesian citizenship (with no inbuilt protection from statelessness). While the law was reformed in 2006, there remains a small number of persons of Indonesian descent who resided in the Philippines and were stripped of their Indonesian citizenship.

Due to barriers to dual nationality in the laws of receiving countries, marriage migrants from Viet Nam had to relinquish citizenship to naturalize as citizens, however, where a relationship was determined to be a ‘sham’ or fraudulent women have been stripped of their nationality without protections from statelessness.

In February 2020, the government of Indonesia disallowed over 1,000 Indonesian citizens who had left Indonesia and joined the Islamic State from returning to the country. While not officially stripping these individuals (who include family members of fighters) of their citizenship, concerns have been raised over the risk of future statelessness faced by this population group. Myanmar’s citizenship legislation includes vague, overarching provisions allowing for the revocation of citizenship. There are no legislative protections for those who have their citizenship revoked from becoming stateless, which could leave some at risk of statelessness. Notably, in Singapore, there is no right to appeal. Naturalized citizens of Singapore may be deprived of their citizenship if they resided outside of Singapore for five continuous years without registering annually at the Singaporean consulate.

4. Administrative Barriers

The denial of civil registration documents and arbitrary and discriminatory applications of policy have played a key role in causing and compounding statelessness in Southeast Asia. For example, low birth registration rates and barriers to birth registration especially among children of migrant workers and communities living in poverty have placed as many as 50 million children in Indonesia at risk of statelessness. In the past decades the provision and withdrawal of civil registration documents has been complex, discriminatory and a key component of the persecution of the Rohingya population in Myanmar. Additionally, the failure of the government of Myanmar to facilitate the naturalization of Rohingya populations, and the degradation of the documented status of Rohingya that is also a key cause of statelessness within Myanmar.

Ethnic minority groups in Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines and Viet Nam have also faced barriers to gaining civil registration and citizenship, with such barriers leading to protracted and intergenerational statelessness. Ethnic Vietnamese populations in Cambodia have also faced discriminatory barriers to both recognition of citizenship and access to citizenship through naturalization. Notably, administrative barriers have continued to limit the ability of members of ‘highland’ communities in Thailand to gain citizenship. Differentiation in treatment by officials, lack of documentation, ingrained concepts of communities as ‘mobile’ and physical/ geographic barriers to accessing communities have complicated the citizenship application/ verification process for these communities. Administrative and practical barriers to accessing birth registration have placed as many as 130,000 Sama Bajau (Bajut Laut) community members — who reside in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia — at risk of statelessness. Additionally, lack of documentation, specifically among older populations in Singapore has left persons stateless since the country’s independence in 1965. In Singapore, heavy penalties for late registration and a lack of registration procedures for children born outside of Singapore present major barriers to birth registration.

5. Requirement of Birth Registration for Citizenship Acquisition

A birth certificate is the primary document proving citizenship in Cambodia, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. In six States (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, and Viet Nam), a birth certificate, among other documents, may certify citizenship. Information is limited on the required documents for proving citizenship in Brunei and Laos.

Birth Registration rates of countries in Southeast Asia

Source: “Birth and Death Registration Completeness” (UN Statistics Division, April 2023); “Data Warehouse,” UNICEF DATA